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Introduction 
Deadly encounters of people of color with law enforcement regularly 
make the national news. Just in recent memory, the string of deaths of 
young African American men at the hands of police officers, which led 
to civil unrest in cities across the United States, has attracted the atten-
tion of the nation.1 Although perhaps less well-known among the gener-
al public,2 police officers at various times also have stood accused of 
using excessive deadly force against Latina/os.3 
Immigrants of color also have been subject to abuse by local law 
enforcement officers. For example, in 1999, New York City Police 
Department officers shot and killed Amadou Diallo, an unarmed immi-
grant from Guinea, in a hail of bullets; two years earlier, officers literally 
tortured Abner Louima, an immigrant from Haiti, in a Brooklyn police 
station.4 Both Diallo and Louima were black. Their race undoubtedly 
 
1. See “Black Lives Matter” Protests, CNN (Oct. 15, 2015, 2:44 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/13/us/gallery/black-lives-matter-protests 
[http://perma.cc/N3LF-66QM] (depicting through a slideshow protests of 
alleged police abuses of African Americans in New York, Seattle, Chicago, 
Oakland, and Washington); L. Song Richardson, Police Racial Violence: 
Lessons From Social Psychology, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 2961, 2961 (2015) 
(“The recent rash of police killing unarmed black men has brought national 
attention to the persistence of policing and racial violence.”); Frances Robles, 
A Florida Killing like Many, Disputed and Little Noticed, N.Y. Times (May 
31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/31/us/a-florida-police-killing-
like-many-disputed-and-little-noticed.html [http://perma.cc/KB4S-MMRY] 
(“From Ferguson, Mo., to Baltimore to Cleveland, the nation seems awash in 
disputed, high-profile cases of police violence.”).  
2. Some commentators have claimed that the mainstream news media tends 
to ignore police brutality directed at Latina/os compared to the widespread 
attention paid to that suffered by African Americans. See Nicole Santa Cruz, 
Ruben Vives & Marisa Gerber, Why the Deaths of Latinos at the Hands of 
Police Haven’t Drawn as Much Attention, L.A. Times (July 18, 2015, 4:00 
AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-0718-latino-police-20150718-
story.html [http://perma.cc/BBE5-MXA4]; Britni Danielle, There’s a Reason 
You Haven’t Heard About the “Latino Lives Matter” Movement, TakePart 
(Mar. 28, 2015), http://takepart.com/article/2015/03/28/why-you-probably-
havent-heard-about-latino-lives-matter-movement [http://perma.cc/7R2X-
6RR3]. 
3. See, e.g., Mary Romero, State Violence, and the Social and Legal Construction 
of Latino Criminality: From El Bandido to Gang Member, 78 Denv. U. L. 
Rev. 1081, 1081–85 (2001) (analyzing the killing of a Latino youth by Phoenix 
police officers); Samantha Masunaga, Protests Mount in Northwest Police 
Shooting, L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 2015, at A18 (reporting on protests in response 
to a fatal police shooting of a Mexican immigrant in Pasco, Washington). 
4. See Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 
Buff. L. Rev. 1275, 1284–86 (1999) (recounting police abuse of Diallo and 
Louima). 
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contributed to the circumstances culminating in their brutal interact-
ions with police. Federal immigration enforcement officers also regularly 
find themselves accused of physically abusing Latina/o immigrant—at 
times with deadly consequences.5 
In less spectacular fashion, police departments across the United 
States engage, on a daily basis, in racial profiling in traffic stops.6 Afric-
an Americans, Latina/os, and other minority groups are profiled by law 
enforcement.7 As these descriptions of law enforcement abuse suggest, 
the racially disparate consequences of law enforcement are widely con-
sidered to be a most serious national criminal justice problem. 
Many Americans support heightened immigration controls. Such 
support is reflected in the popularity of high removal numbers and sym-
bolized in physical form by the steady lengthening of the wall along the 
U.S./Mexico border.8 Mass deportations of “criminal aliens,” who Presi-
dent Obama has referred to with the racially-charged phrase “gang 
 
5. See Homeland Security Advisory Council, Interim Report of the 
CBP Integrity Advisory Council (2015) (documenting, among other 
problems, physical abuse of Latina/o and other immigrants by U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection officers); Nigel Duara, Border Patrol Agent is Indicted 
in Fatal Shooting of Mexican Teen, L.A. Times (Sept. 24, 2015, 3:49 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-border-patrol-agent-
indicted-20150923-story.html [http://perma.cc/Y3PB-22J3] (reporting on 
the indictment of a Border Patrol officer for the murder of a Mexican national 
at the U.S./Mexico border); Garrett M. Graff, The Green Monster: How the 
Border Patrol Became America’s Most Out-of-Control Law Enforcement 
Agency, Politico (Nov./Dec. 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/ 
story/2014/10/border-patrol-the-green-monster-112220#.VQiROGTF880 
[http://perma.cc/Y4PJ-9496] (describing violent behavior of some Border 
Patrol agents). 
6. See infra Part I.A. (examining the legal decisions in effect authorizing racial 
profiling among law enforcement in the United States). 
7. Id.  
8. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Why a Wall?, 2 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 147 (2012) 
(analyzing the political and symbolic significance of the “border wall” between 
the United States and Mexico, which has been extended in recent years). 
The emergence of Donald Trump as a leading contender for the Republican 
nomination for President suggests the general popularity of immigration 
enforcement with some segments of the American public. Charging that the 
Mexican government sends its nation’s criminals to the United States, Trump 
called for expanded border security, extension of the U.S.–Mexico border fence, 
and mass deportations of undocumented immigrants. Shortly after making 
such extreme claims, Trump surged to the lead of the Republican candidates 
in public opinion polls. See Raf Sanchez, Donald Trump Uses Killing of US 
Woman by Illegal Immigrant to Justify Mexican “Rapists and Criminals” 
Claim, Telegraph (July 6, 2015, 5:21 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/us-election/11721409/Donald-Trump-uses-killing-of-US-woman-
by-illegal-immigrant-to-justify-Mexican-rapists-and-criminals-claim.html 
[http://perma.cc/AD9M-BW3K]. 
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bangers,9 have served as the cornerstone of the current administration’s 
immigration enforcement strategy.10 For a variety of reasons, the targ-
eting of criminal noncitizens for removal has proven to be popular with 
the general public. Most notably, public safety concerns arguably weigh 
in favor of allocating limited federal immigration enforcement resources 
toward efforts to remove noncitizens convicted of crimes from the Unit-
ed States. 
The political process often punishes noncitizens with criminal prob-
lems. Noncitizens are a particularly vulnerable group in the political 
process.11 First off, they lack the right to vote and thus do not possess 
formal political power through the ballot box to protect themselves 
from punitive measures. As a consequence, immigrants in general have 
been subject to discrimination at various times in U.S. history.12 
Moreover, immigrants with criminal problems are among the most 
disfavored of the generally disfavored group of noncitizens in the politic-
al process. Relatively few contemporary immigrant rights advocates ex-
pend much political capital seeking to defend immigrants convicted of 
crimes in immigration law and policy debates.13 Consequently, the law 
and its enforcement over the years has increasingly targeted—some crit-
ics might contend consciously punished—noncitizens who have had vir-
tually any brushes with the criminal justice system.14 
The Obama administration has strived to prove to the public and 
policy-makers its firm commitment to vigorous enforcement of the im-
migration laws.15 Well-publicized increases in the number of immigrant 
removals have been the centerpiece of nothing less than a sustained 
political campaign to convince Congress to enact comprehensive immi-
gration reform, 16  for which the President has repeatedly expressed 
 
9. Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, 
Records Show, N.Y. Times (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 
04/07/us/more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows.html [http:// 
perma.cc/JEH7-YYSZ] (quoting President Obama). 
10. See infra Part II. 
11. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, The “Huddled Masses” Myth: 
Immigration and Civil Rights (2004) (analyzing the history of discrimin-
ation against various minority immigrant groups under the U.S. immigration 
laws and their enforcement). 
12. Id. 
13. See infra Part III.A. 
14. See infra Part II. 
15. See infra notes 92–99. 
16. See Thompson & Cohen, supra note 9 (exploring deportation for minor crimes 
and its importance as a political issue). 
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support.17 The conventional wisdom has been that a firm commitment 
to aggressive border enforcement will ultimately help to persuade Con-
gress that the time has come to enact immigration reform. The Obama 
administration’s dedication to enforcement can be seen in the much-
criticized mass detention and removal of thousands of women and child-
ren fleeing widespread violence in Central America in 2014.18 
 
17. See, e.g., President Obama on Immigration Reform: “I Am Not Going to 
Give Up This Fight Until It Gets Done,” White House Blog (Oct. 3, 2014, 
4:41 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/10/03/president-obama-
immigration-reform-i-am-not-going-give-fight-until-it-gets-done [http:// 
perma.cc/P8GR-HPXG] (featuring a video of President Obama speaking on 
immigration with a summary of his remarks). Most comprehensive immi-
gration reform proposals would provide some combination of the following: 
(1) a path to a durable legal status for certain categories of undocumented 
immigrants, often championed as a path to legalization or derided as an 
“amnesty”; (2) expanded avenues for lawful immigration to the United States 
through, for example, guest worker programs; and (3) bolstered enforcement 
of the immigration laws. For a review of various possibilities for immigration 
reform, see Kevin R. Johnson, Ten Guiding Principles for Truly Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform: A Blueprint, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1599 (2009) (outlining 
principles that should guide immigration reform); Kevin R. Johnson, Possible 
Reforms of the U.S. Immigration Laws, 18 Chap. L. Rev. 315 (2015) 
(examining the impact of contemporary immigration laws and exploring 
possibilities for reform); see also Angélica Cházaro, Beyond Respectability: 
Dismantling the Harms of “Illegality,” 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355 (2015) 
(criticizing various legalization proposals based on the claim that they will 
increase the vulnerability of noncitizens who are not eligible for relief). 
18. See Flores v. Lynch, No. CV 85-04544 DMG (Ex), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
112911 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015) (denying a motion to reconsider a ruling 
that the U.S. government’s immigration detention and other responses to 
the 2014 increase in the migration of Central American minors to the United 
States violated a consent decree); Scott Rempell, Credible Fears, Unaccomp-
anied Minors, and the Causes of the Southwestern Border Surge, 18 Chap. 
L. Rev. 337 (2015) (analyzing the response of the Obama administration to 
the increase in the number of Central American women and children coming 
to the United States); Margaret H. Taylor & Kit Johnson, “Vast Hordes 
. . . Crowding in Upon Us”: The Executive Branch’s Response to Mass 
Migration and the Legacy of Chae Chan Ping, 68 Okla. L. Rev. 186, 192–
207 (2015) (analyzing President Obama’s mass detention and rapid immi-
gration processing of Central American women traveling with children); 
Mariela Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection of Profiteering and 
Immigration Detention, Neb. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the author) (describing the mass detention of Central 
American women and children by the Obama administration); see also Daniel 
Kanstroom & Jessica Chicco, The Forgotten Deported: A Declaration on 
the Rights of Expelled and Deported Persons, 47 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 
537, 538 (2015) (“The allure of deportation for governments is apparent, 
as it serves many diverse goals, including most obviously extended border 
control, interior immigration enforcement, national security, criminal law 
enforcement, labor market regulation, and various other forms of social 
control.”) (footnote omitted); Marcia Zug, The Mirage of Immigration Reform: 
The Devastating Consequences of Obama’s Immigration Policy, 63 Kan. L. 
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Not surprisingly, focusing deportation efforts on noncitizens who 
encounter a criminal justice system well-known for racial bias has had 
racially disparate impacts on the removal of noncitizens from the Unit-
ed States. Specifically, racial profiling in criminal law enforcement—
including but not limited to that widely employed by law enforcement 
in the “war on drugs,” combined with removal efforts increasingly dir-
ected at noncitizens who have had encounters with the criminal justice 
system—has had devastating effects on immigrants of color across the 
United States.19 These systems, operating in a coordinated fashion, have 
contributed to the fact that today more than 95 percent of the non-
citizens removed annually from the United States are from Mexico and 
Central America.20 That incredibly high percentage represents a much 
larger percentage than the Latina/o composition of the nation’s overall 
immigrant—both legal and unauthorized−population.21 
Unfortunately, racially discriminatory immigration laws and their 
enforcement have a long tradition in the United States. The U.S. gov-
ernment has targeted Latina/o immigrants for presumptive removal 
from the country for most of the twentieth century.22 Before that, the 
law expressly made immigrants from Asia the primary focus of exclu-
sion and discriminatory enforcement.23 Other immigrant groups at var-
ious times in U.S. history have been subject to scorn and harsh treat-
ment through restrictive immigration laws and their enforcement.24 
Today’s racially disparate removals of Latina/os are entirely consis-
tent with the widespread popular belief that Mexican immigrants as a 
group are predisposed to criminal activity. Well-known public figures, 
such as 2016 candidate for the Republican nomination for president 
 
Rev. 953, 953–54 (2015) (examining the punitive nature of the Obama admin-
istration’s immigration policies). 
19. See infra Part I.B.2. 
20. See infra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. 
21. See Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the War on Drugs Meets the 
Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48 U. 
Mich. J.L. Reform 967, 976–77 (2015) (citing sources with statistical data 
supporting this assertion). 
22. See generally Alfredo Mirandé, Gringo Justice (1987) (analyzing the 
history of racial disparities in U.S. immigration enforcement and law enforce-
ment). 
23. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (upholding 
a law allowing for the deportation of Chinese noncitizens); Chae Chan Ping 
v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (rejecting 
constitutional challenges to law requiring the exclusion of Chinese noncitizens 
from the United States). 
24. See generally Johnson, supra note 11 (analyzing the history of discrimination 
against various minority groups under the U.S. immigration laws and their 
enforcement). 
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Donald Trump and flamboyant conservative political pundit Ann 
Coulter, forcefully express these views.25 Such incendiary charges feed 
into the widespread presumption that all persons of Mexican ancestry, 
U.S. citizens and noncitizens alike, are subject to deportation from the 
United States. In contrast to the exaggerated claims that the nation is 
being overrun by criminals from foreign lands, social science research 
has found time and time again that immigrants—including those from 
Mexico and the rest of Latin America—are on average more, not less, 
law-abiding than U.S. citizens.26 
The growing confluence of criminal law and immigration law  
has garnered considerable scholarly attention. The last few years have 
seen the emergence of a vibrant body of what has been dubbed 
“crimmigration” law scholarship. Generally speaking, this “scholar- 
ship describes and critiques the way that immigration and criminal law 
interact.” 27  It specifically questions the ever-tightening relationship  
25. See, e.g., Ann Coulter, ¡Adios, America!: The Left’s Plan to Turn 
Our Country into a Third World Hellhole (2015) (contending that 
Mexican immigrants pose a greater public safety risk to the United States 
than Muslim terrorists); Sanchez, supra note 8 (reporting on Donald Trump’s 
statements about the criminal propensities of Mexican immigrants). See 
generally Romero, supra note 3 (considering the impacts on the law and its 
enforcement of the popular stereotype that Latina/os are criminals); Deborah 
Weissman, The Politics of Narrative: Law and the Representation of Mexican 
Criminality, 38 Fordham Int’l L.J. 141 (2015) (analyzing in detail the 
influence of stereotypes of Mexican criminality on American law and policy). 
26. See Emily Ryo, Less Enforcement, More Compliance: Rethinking Unauthorized 
Migration, 62 UCLA L. REV. 622, 624–28 (2015) (observing that the great 
weight of empirical data demonstrates the falsity of the recurring claim that 
immigrants are particularly prone to criminal activity). For a recent analysis 
of the data, which is consistent with a string of previous studies, finding that 
immigrants (including Mexican immigrants) are less prone than U.S. citizens 
to engage in criminal activity, see Walter A. Ewing, Daniel E. Martínez 
& Rubén G. Rumbaut, American Immigration Council, The Criminal-
ization of Immigration in the United States 4–9 (2015), http:// 
immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/criminalization-immigration-united-
states [http://perma.cc/V54N-N575]. 
27. Daniel I. Morales, Crimes of Migration, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1257, 
1260 (2014) (footnote omitted). The growing body of scholarship focusing on 
the relationship between criminal law and immigration enforcement includes, 
among many articles: Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 
102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 613 (2012); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New 
Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice 
Norms, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 469 (2007); Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. 
Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 Am. Crim. 
L. Rev. 105 (2012); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between 
Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. Third 
World L.J. 81, 83–86 (2005); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: 
Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 367 (2006). 
See generally Governing Immigration Through Crime: A Reader (Julie 
A. Dowling & Jonathan Xavier Inda eds., 2013) (collecting articles analyzing 
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between immigration law and criminal law, which results in harsh con-
sequences for immigrants, their families, and the greater community.28 
This Article agrees with the fairness critique of crimmigration scho-
lars of the growing link between the criminal justice system and immi-
gration removals. It contends, however, that the criticism has failed to 
sufficiently scrutinize the glaringly disparate impacts of tying removals 
to alleged criminal activity on immigrants of color. Specifically, the em-
erging crimmigration scholarship generally fails to analyze in depth the 
systematic and institutionalized role of race in modern criminal law 
enforcement. Moreover, for the most part the scholarship ignores how 
those racial impacts are magnified by the operation of a federal immi-
gration removal process that through a variety of programs targets 
“criminal aliens.”29 
The general public enthusiastically embraces mass removals of non-
citizens with criminal entanglements.30 The truth of the matter is that 
the removal of thousands of noncitizens of color who have encountered 
the criminal justice system is unlikely to generate significant public 
controversy, much less meaningful political resistance. Indeed, the pub-
lic appears for the most part ready and willing to support the removal 
of large numbers of Latina/o immigrants from the United States. The 
fact that the group of people most directly affected by the removals are 
a discrete and insular political minority—noncitizens of color who 
 
the use of criminal laws to enforce immigration laws). The CrImmigration blog, 
managed by Professor César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, provides updates 
on developments in the law concerning reliance on the criminal law in immi-
gration enforcement. crImmigration, http://crimmigration.com/ [http:// 
perma.cc/5UL7-927Y] (last visited Apr. 24, 2016). 
28. See Katherine Beckett & Heather Evans, Crimmigration at the Local Level: 
Criminal Justice Processes in the Shadow of Deportation, 49 Law & Soc’y 
Rev. 241, 274 (2015) (concluding that changes in immigration enforcement 
“appear[] to have transformed the criminal process for non-citizens in state 
and local justice systems in ways that enhance the pain associated with 
criminal punishment” and that, “[g]iven the large number and growing number 
of non-citizen residents of the United States and the unprecedented magnitude 
of the U.S. criminal justice system, the impact of immigration law and enforce-
ment on the criminal process can no longer be ignored”). 
29. See Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of 
Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1509, 
1531–34 (1995) (analyzing the impact of the negative perception of “criminal 
aliens” on American immigration laws and their enforcement); Yolanda 
Vázquez, Constructing Crimmigration: Latino Subordination in a “Post-
Racial” World, 76 Ohio St. L.J. 599, 640–50 (2015) (evaluating the evolution 
of the conception of the “criminal alien” under the U.S. immigration laws). 
For sustained criticism of the focus of modern removal efforts on “criminal 
aliens,” see Angélica Cházaro, Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm, 
63 UCLA L. Rev. 594 (2016). 
30. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
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cannot vote—thus far has tended to dampen political opposition to the 
removals.31 
Part I of this Article considers parallel developments in the law that 
contribute to what can be characterized as the emergence of nothing 
less than a Latina/o removal system. It first considers the Supreme 
Court’s implicit sanctioning of race-conscious law enforcement in the 
United States, with the centerpiece of this symposium, Whren v. United 
States,32 perhaps the most well-known example. Second, it summarizes 
the trend over the last twenty years toward greatly increased cooper-
ation between state and local law enforcement agencies and federal 
immigration enforcement authorities. Part I proceeds to analyze how 
and why an increasing number of state and local governments through 
what are popularly known as “sanctuary laws” have rejected unrestrict-
ed cooperation by law enforcement with federal immigration authori-
ties. Despite the “sanctuary” moniker attached to these laws, effective 
policing—even though influenced to a certain extent by sympathy for 
the devastating impacts of removals on the lives of immigrants—is the 
policy rationale most commonly embraced by local political leaders and 
law enforcement officers for these laws and policies.33 
Part II demonstrates how local criminal arrests and prosecutions 
influenced by police reliance on race inexorably contribute to the racial-
ly disparate removal rates experienced in the modern United States. To 
their credit, scholars have begun to engage with the racial impacts of 
linking removals of immigrants to interactions with the criminal justice 
system.34 Yolanda Vásquez, for example, has thoroughly documented 
 
31. Id.; see infra Part I.B.2. 
32. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
33. See infra Part I.B.2. 
34. See, e.g., Mary Fan, The Case for Crimmigration Reform, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 
75, 89–100 (2013) (contending that the increase in the Asian and Latina/o 
populations in the United States transformed the nature of the debate over 
immigration reform and making the case for reform of the criminal removal 
provisions of the immigration laws); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, 
Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. Rev. 1457, 1461–67 (acknowledging 
the disparate racial impacts of the criminal justice system on modern federal 
immigration enforcement); Katarina Ramos, Criminalizing Race in the Name 
of Secure Communities, 48 Cal. W. L. Rev. 317, 337–38 (2012) (criticizing 
the racial impacts of the operation of the Secure Communities program); 
Carrie L. Rosenbaum, The Role of Equality Principles in Preemption Analysis 
of Sub-Federal Immigration Laws: The California TRUST Act, 18 Chap. 
L. Rev. 481, 492–98 (2015) (criticizing the central role of race in the operation 
of the Secure Communities program); Maureen A. Sweeney, Shadow Immi-
gration Enforcement and Its Constitutional Dangers, 104 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 227 (2014) (analyzing the increasingly common phenomenon 
of state and local law enforcement involvement in federal immigration 
enforcement and the resulting negative impacts on minority communities); 
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the adverse impacts on Latina/os resulting from the fact that contem-
porary removals are largely based on the criminal activities of non-
citizens; she concludes that the general color-blind approach toward 
removing criminals present in U.S. immigration law has undisputable 
anti-Latina/o impacts.35 Scholars in disciplines other than law also have 
begun to critically assess the devastating impacts of criminal removals 
on Latina/os.36 
Part III of this Article concludes by contending that law- and 
policy-makers should devote greater attention to the racially disparate 
impacts of tightly linking removals of immigrants to a racially suspect 
criminal justice system.37 It sketches a number of possible reforms—
some that are relatively small and incremental in nature, others more 
far-reaching—to the U.S. immigration laws that would tend to blunt, 
rather than exacerbate, the anti-Latina/o impacts of the modern Ameri-
can immigration state.38 
I. Racial Profiling and Contemporary Developments 
in Crime-Based Removals 
This Part of the Article first considers the Supreme Court’s endor-
sement of racial profiling in ordinary criminal law enforcement and the 
enforcement of the immigration laws. Two important decisions operate 
together to systematically shape contemporary interactions of law en-
forcement officers with communities of color across the United States 
 
see also Rebecca A. Hufstader, Note, Immigration Reliance on Gang Data-
bases: Unchecked Discretion and Undesirable Consequences, 90 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 671 (2015) (demonstrating the disparate racial consequences of the 
reliance by federal immigration enforcement authorities on state and local 
gang databases). 
35. Vázquez, supra note 29.  
36. See, e.g., Tanya Golash-Boza, Deported: Policing Immigrants, 
Disposable Labor and Global Capitalism (2015); Tanya Golash-Boza 
& Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, Latino Immigrant Men and the Deportation 
Crisis: A Gendered Racial Removal Program, 11 Latino Stud. 271 (2013) 
(exploring the disproportionate targeting of Latino men in U.S. deportations); 
Doris Marie Provine & Roxanne Lynn Doty, The Criminalization of Immi-
grants as a Racial Project, 27 J. Contemp. Crim. Just. 261, 261 (2011) 
(arguing that contemporary immigration policies “reinforce racialized 
anxieties”). 
37. Along similar lines, “[c]riminal law scholars have emphasized race and class 
inequality in the criminal justice system yet have not given non-citizen defend-
ants any special analytical attention based on their alienage.” Ingrid V. Eagly, 
Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1281, 1284–85 (2010) (emphasis 
added). 
38. See infra Part III.B. 
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and contribute to the fact that removals overwhelmingly fall on Lat-
ina/o immigrants.39 
Part I next summarizes the movement toward a greater state and 
local law enforcement role in federal immigration enforcement. That 
development has been fueled in no small part by emerging fears gener-
ated by changes brought by the much-publicized growth of the Latina/o 
population, even though that growth has slowed in the last few years.40 
Antipathy for immigrants and Latina/os also has helped to generate 
support for these laws and policies.41 As implemented at the ground 
level, enhanced state and local immigration enforcement measures that 
feed into the federal removal machinery have had nothing less than 
devastating impacts on Latina/o immigrants and U.S. citizens.42 
Working together, these parallel developments have helped contrib-
ute to a pattern of racially disparate removals of noncitizens from the 
United States. Latina/os have specifically borne the brunt of the record-
setting numbers of removals during the Obama presidency.43 The fact 
that the immigration removal system results in the removal of non-
citizens who are virtually all Latina/o contributes to the perception 
among a large number of Americans that the modern U.S. immigration 
 
39. See infra Part I.A.B.  
40. See, e.g., Jens Manuel Krogstad & Mark Hugo Lopez, Hispanic Population 
Reaches Record 55 Million, but Growth Has Cooled, Pew Res. Ctr. (June 
25, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/25/u-s-hispanic- 
population-growth-surge-cools/ [http://perma.cc/R2FC-HYTC] (providing 
information about growth of the Latina/o population in the United States). 
The latest research shows that more Mexican citizens are leaving, not migra-
ting to, the United States. See Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, More Mexicans Leaving 
Than Coming to the U.S., Pew Res. Ctr. (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www. 
pewhispanic.org/2015/11/19/more-mexicans-leaving-than-coming-to-the-u-s/ 
[http://perma.cc/F9GZ-4UX2] (noting that ”the overall flow of Mexican 
immigrants between the two countries is at its smallest since the 1990s). In 
the long run, the changes in immigration may affect the U.S. labor markets. 
See Karthick Ramakrishnan, Mexican Migrants are Heading Back Home—
and That’s Bad News for the U.S. Economy, L.A. Times (Nov. 27, 2015, 5:00 
AM) http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1127-ramakrishnan-net-
outflow-20151127-story.html [http://perma.cc/JZT9-9A9H] (arguing that 
“[w]ith the wave of baby boom retirements growing each year, demand for 
immigrant workers will only increase”). 
41. See infra text accompanying note 127 (discussing the impact of antipathy 
for immigrants and Latina/os on law and policy). 
42. See infra Part I.B.; see also Daniel N. Ramirez & Peter G. Dawson, 
“CrImmigration Law” and its Relation to America’s Hispanic Population, 
40 T. Marshall L. Rev. 8 Online, no. 3, 2015, at 3 (“[F]oreign national 
members of the U.S. Hispanic population face far more severe consequences in 
relation to common criminal matters than their U.S. citizen counterparts.”). 
43. See infra text accompanying notes 92–99 (presenting data on the Obama 
administration’s removals). 
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removal system discriminates, perhaps even intentionally, on the basis 
of race.44 One might not expect such an outcome from an administration 
led by a president who has expressed a firm commitment to immigration 
reform and was elected with the support of the overwhelming majority 
of Latina/o voters.45 
A. The Supreme Court’s Authorization of Racial Profiling  
in Law Enforcement 
In two critically important decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
encouraged, or, at a minimum, failed to affirmatively discourage, law 
enforcement officers’ reliance on race as a core investigatory tool in the 
enforcement of both the criminal and immigration laws. These decisions 
deeply embed race in modern criminal law enforcement and immigra-
tion removal operations in the United States. 
At the outset, it is worth mentioning that a glaring divide exists 
between the legal and public discourses about the appropriate role of 
race in criminal law enforcement. On the one hand, the law, as it has 
developed, effectively authorizes race-conscious law enforcement and 
imposes sanctions on only the most glaring incidents of racial miscon-
duct.46 On the other hand, although support exists in some quarters for 
racial profiling,47 a vocal segment of the public condemns in rather un-
forgiving fashion police reliance on racial stereotypes in the enforcement 
of criminal law.48 
 
44. See infra Part I.B. (analyzing the relationship between race and the modern 
U.S. immigration removal system). 
45. See supra text accompanying notes 15–18.  
46. See infra Part I.A.1–B. (examining the ways in which law enforcement can 
discriminate based on race). 
47. Although much criticized, racial profiling of Arabs and Muslims is a popular 
component of various governmental measures directed at preventing terrorism. 
See, e.g., Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The 
Consequences of Racial Profiling After September 11, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 1185 
(2002). 
48. See, e.g., Jesse L. Jackson Sr., Baltimore: We Have Been Here Before, 
Philadelphia Trib. (May 1, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.phillytrib.com/ 
commentary/baltimore-we-have-been-here-before/article_324427c8-0052-
5c66-945c-5d270a6d5cc4.html [http://perma.cc/B9KL-69U4]. “Before Sept-
ember 11, national polls showed such overwhelming public opposition to racial 
profiling that both [former] U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft and [former] 
President George W. Bush felt compelled to condemn the practice. There 
was a strong belief that racial profiling was inefficient, ineffective, and unfair.” 
Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1575, 1576 
(2002) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 4·2016 
Doubling Down on Racial Discrimination 
1005 
1. Whren v. United States 
In Whren v. United States,49 the landmark 1996 criminal procedure 
decision that is the focal point of this symposium, the Supreme Court 
held that a stop of a motor vehicle did not run afoul of the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures so long 
as the police had probable cause to believe that a traffic infraction had 
been committed—even if the officers admittedly employed the violation 
as a pretext to stop a vehicle because of the race of its occupants.50 The 
decision effectively authorized traffic stops by police based on the race 
of the occupants of a motor vehicle. It, therefore, contributes to the 
prevalence of racial profiling in the modern United States. 
The Whren decision “launched a firestorm of virtually unanimous 
[academic] criticism.”51 That criticism stems from the fact that the de-
cision in effect authorizes racial profiling in run-of-the-mill traffic stops, 
a common modern law-enforcement technique. By many accounts, 
racial profiling currently is routine among state and local police in juris-
dictions across the United States.52 It has become an integral tool 
 
49. 517 U.S. 806 (1996); see Kevin R. Johnson, The Story of Whren v. United 
States: The Song Remains the Same, in Race Law Stories 419 (Rachel F. 
Moran & Devon Carbado eds., 2008) (analyzing the factual background of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in, and the impacts of, Whren v. United States). 
50. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 816–19 (“For the run-of-the-mine case, which this 
surely is, we think there is no realistic alternative to the traditional common-
law rule that probable cause justifies a search and seizure.”). 
51. Margaret M. Lawton, The Road to Whren and Beyond: Does the “Would 
Have” Test Work?, 57 DePaul L. Rev. 917, 917 (2008); see, e.g., Gabriel J. 
Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional Racial Profiling 
and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 882, 887 (2015) (“Scholars have been overwhelmingly critical of Whren.”) 
(footnote omitted); Lewis R. Katz, “Lonesome Road”: Driving Without the 
Fourth Amendment, 36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1413, 1414 (2013) (criticizing 
the marginalization of “the Fourth Amendment’s core value of preventing 
arbitrary police behavior”). See generally Devon W. Carbado, [E]Racing the 
Fourth Amendment, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 946 (2002) (exploring in detail the 
racial dimensions of the modern Supreme Court’s body of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence). 
52. Critical analysis of racial profiling in criminal law enforcement is voluminous. 
See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial 
Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 651 (2002) 
(discussing problems with racial profiling by the Maryland State Police); 
David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While 
Black” Matters, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (1999) (analyzing data supporting the 
claims of racial profiling of African Americans); Tracey Maclin, Race and the 
Fourth Amendment, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333, 342 (1998) (arguing that the 
current Fourth Amendment framework under Whren “does not stop arbitrary 
seizures because it fails to consider that police discretion, police perjury, and 
the mutual distrust between blacks and the police are issues intertwined with 
the enforcement of traffic stops”); Floyd Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling 
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employed in the much-maligned, yet nevertheless aggressively enforced, 
“war on drugs.”53 Profiling is a well-known component of a criminal 
justice system that critics contend is, at bottom, racially biased.54 
The Court in Whren v. United States explained in conclusory fash-
ion that any claim of racial discrimination by the police fell outside the 
purview of the Fourth Amendment, but is properly brought under the 
auspices of the Equal Protection guarantee of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.55 What the Court wholly failed to acknowledge, however, 
is that Equal Protection claims are notoriously difficult to prove and 
thus cannot reasonably be relied upon to serve as an effective deterrent 
to excessive police reliance on race in traffic stops.56 Indeed, the decision 
in Whren serves to create strong, if not almost irresistible, incentives 
for police officers to manufacture reasons other than race to justify a 
stop—even if race in fact was the true reason for the stop. 
Under current Supreme Court precedent, a plaintiff seeking to est-
ablish an Equal Protection violation must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the police acted with a discriminatory intent, not 
simply that the action, practice, or policy had a discriminatory impact 
 
of African-Americans in the Selective Enforcement of Laws: In Search of Viable 
Remedies, 65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 721 (2004) (identifying existing approaches to 
addressing racial profiling and analyzing the various alternatives). 
53. See Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law 
of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States 
and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 Geo. L.J. 1005, 1045–75 
(2010) (noting that, despite similar rates of drug use between individuals of 
different races, the impact of the “war on drugs” has been particularly deva-
stating in minority communities); see also infra text accompanying notes 70, 
99 (analyzing the concerns with the prevalence of racial profiling of Latina/os 
by state and local police officers). 
54. See generally Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarcer-
ation in the Age of Colorblindness (2010) (documenting the re-emergence 
of a caste-like system in the United States resulting from the incarceration 
of millions of African Americans, effectively relegating them to a permanent 
second-class underclass status in American society); David Cole, No Equal 
Justice: Race and Class in the American Criminal Justice System 
(1999); Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law (1998); Katheryn 
K. Russell, The Color of Crime: Racial Hoaxes, White Fear, Black 
Protectionism, Police Harassment, and Other Macroaggressions 
(1998). 
55. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (making that observation and further noting 
that “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth 
Amendment analysis”). 
56. See infra text accompanying notes 57 and 58 (discussing the difficulty in 
proving Equal Protection claims). 
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on racial minorities.57 Plaintiffs rarely can produce the evidence necess-
ary to establish a culpable state of mind by state actors; officers general-
ly can easily defeat a charge of discriminatory intent by pointing to a 
race-neutral pretext, such as a minor traffic violation, for the stop.58 
In any event, even if one is successful in proving an Equal Protec-
tion claim, that would not disturb a criminal conviction resulting from 
a traffic stop that in reality was based on race. That conviction, in turn, 
could well lead to incarceration, and possible removal, of a noncitizen. 
2. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce 
More than twenty years before it decided Whren v. United States,59 
the Supreme Court authorized a form of racial profiling by immigration 
enforcement officers making stops in ordinary enforcement operations. 
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,60 the Court held that race alone 
could not serve as the sole basis for an immigration stop of a motor 
vehicle under the Fourth Amendment.61 At the same time, however, the 
Court stated that “Mexican appearance” could be one factor among 
others justifying a stop. In the Court’s words, “[t]he likelihood that any 
given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make  
57. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–42 (1976) (holding that, to prevail 
on an Equal Protection claim, a plaintiff must establish a “discriminatory 
intent” by a state actor, not simply the disparate impacts of a law, policy, or 
practice). For the leading criticism of the discriminatory intent requirement 
in modern Equal Protection doctrine, see Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, 
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. 
L. Rev. 317 (1987) (reviewing modern racial discrimination and proposing 
a “cultural meaning” test to address such discrimination). 
58. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996) (refusing to 
find that, despite overwhelming statistical evidence of racially disparate 
impacts on African Americans of crack cocaine prosecutions, the plaintiffs had 
failed to establish an Equal Protection claim); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 
279, 298–99 (1987) (rejecting the Equal Protection claim of an African 
American facing the death penalty despite strong evidence of racially 
disparate impacts of imposition of the death penalty); Brown v. City of 
Oneonta, 195 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting an Equal Protection challenge 
to local police questioning of virtually all African American males (and one 
woman) in a small town after a victim reported that the perpetrator of the 
crime was black). 
59. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
60. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
61.  Id. at 885–87; see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562–63 
(1976) (refusing to find a violation of the Fourth Amendment based on an 
immigration officer’s decision to refer a motor vehicle to secondary inspection 
at an immigration checkpoint miles away from the Mexico–United States 
border based on the “apparent Mexican ancestry” of the occupants of the 
vehicle). The stop in Brignoni-Ponce led to a criminal prosecution for the 
knowing transportation of undocumented immigrants. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U.S. at 875. 
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Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it does not 
justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens.”62 
Put differently, the Court in Brignoni-Ponce found that an immi-
gration stop based on “Mexican appearance,” even though that descrip-
tion is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad (i.e., it includes U.S. citizens 
and lawful immigrants as well as undocumented ones),63 is permissible 
so long as combined with other factors.64 To exacerbate matters, the 
Supreme Court has further emphasized that immigration officers can 
consider a multitude of factors in immigration stops and emphasized 
that courts generally should defer to the officers’ judgment in decisions 
to make a stop.65 
Commentators have criticized modern racial profiling in immigra-
tion enforcement.66 The criticism, however, has not changed the fact 
 
62. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886–87. 
63. See Kevin R. Johnson, “Melting Pot” or “Ring of Fire”?: Assimilation and 
the Mexican-American Experience, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1259, 1291–93 (1997) 
(noting great variation in physical appearance among persons of Latina/o 
ancestry). 
64. See, e.g., United States v. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 935 n.6 (9th Cir. 
2006) (holding that Hispanic appearance might be a legitimate factor in an 
immigration stop near the Canada–United States border). But see United 
States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 
(distinguishing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and holding that Hispanic 
appearance could not be a factor justifying an immigration stop in the Mexico–
United States border region because significant numbers of persons in the 
general population in that part of the country with that general appearance 
are U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants). 
65. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (reversing a 
decision finding that a stop violated the Fourth Amendment and stating that 
“[w]hen discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable-suspicion 
determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the ‘totality 
of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a 
‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing”) (citation 
omitted). 
66. See Johnson, supra note 53, at 1009–45 (analyzing in detail how the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce effectively authorized a form of 
racial profiling in immigration enforcement); Sweeney, supra note 34, at 234–
53 (reviewing critically the important role of race in both ordinary law and 
immigration enforcement); see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Border Exception-
alism in the Era of Moving Borders, 38 Fordham Urb. L.J. 129, 134–53 
(2010) (analyzing the expansion of “border exceptionalism” in the application 
of the Fourth Amendment and related constitutional doctrines permitting 
practices in immigration enforcement that generally are not permitted by 
the Constitution in other areas); Christian Briggs, Note, The Reasonableness 
of a Race-Based Suspicion: The Fourth Amendment and the Costs and Benefits 
of Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 379 
(2015) (assessing critically the relative costs and benefits of racial profiling in 
immigration enforcement). For criticism of the role of race in immigration 
enforcement under modern constitutional doctrine, see Devon W. Carbado & 
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that race remains a frequently considered factor in modern immigration 
stops.67 
As is the case with allegations of racial profiling in traffic stops, an 
Equal Protection claim may be brought challenging an immigration 
stop for being exclusively based on race. Such a claim, however, is extre-
mely difficult to prove68 and, in any event, would generally not defeat 
a removal order. 69 Such claims therefore cannot be expected to serve as 
a meaningful deterrent to racial profiling in the enforcement of the 
immigration laws.  
Courts today routinely rely on Brignoni-Ponce to justify immigra-
tion stops in cases in which immigration enforcement officers consider 
the “Hispanic appearance” of the occupants of a motor vehicle, so long 
as combined with other seemingly race-neutral (and possibly pretext-
ual) factors.70 The Supreme Court’s decisions in Whren and Brignoni-
Ponce together have made it possible for modern law enforcement 
 
Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1543, 
1547–48 (2011) (arguing that “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence . . . facilitates 
both the idea that Latinos are presumptively undocumented . . . and the 
practice of detaining Latinos because of that presumption,” and noting that 
“for the most part, criminal procedure scholars have not engaged this racial 
dynamic”). 
67. Importantly, the exclusionary rule barring admission of evidence secured in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment in criminal proceedings does not generally 
apply to removal proceedings, which the courts have classified as civil, not 
criminal, in nature. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1040–50 (1984) 
(“In these circumstances, we are persuaded that the . . . balance between 
costs and benefits comes out against applying the exclusionary rule in civil 
deportation hearings . . . .”); see also Jason A. Cade, Policing the Immigration 
Police: ICE Prosecutorial Discretion and the Fourth Amendment, 113 
Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 180 (2013), http://columbialawreview.org/policing- 
the-immigration-police_cade/ [http://perma.cc/9GHN-NPPK] (discussing 
the adverse impacts of the Supreme Court’s holding in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza 
that, except in egregious circumstances, the exclusionary rule does not apply 
to removal proceedings). 
68. See, e.g., infra note 161 (providing an example of an extreme pattern and 
practice of racial discrimination violations by local law enforcement agency 
in criminal and immigration law enforcement).  
69. See supra text accompanying notes 57 and 58 (illustrating the difficulties in 
prevailing on an Equal Protection claim). 
70. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration 
Enforcement, 78 Wash. U. L.Q. 675, 696–707 (2000) (reviewing the many 
cases permitting the use of “Mexican” and “Hispanic appearance” as one 
factor considered by the Border Patrol in an immigration stop); see, e.g., 
United States v. Zapata-Ibarra, 212 F.3d 877, 881–84 (5th Cir. 2000) (looking 
at the totality of the circumstances in analyzing the specific facts of the case); 
United States v. Telles-Montenegro, No. 8:09-CR-502-T-17TGW, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 17259, at *11–20 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2010) (same). 
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officers in the United States to rely heavily upon race.71 As a result of 
those two decisions, law enforcement agencies frequently employ race 
as a central investigatory tool in contemporary criminal and immigra-
tion enforcement.72 
At the same time, the allegedly impermissible consideration of race 
is at the core of many high-profile public controversies over abuses of 
authority by law enforcement officers with adverse impacts on racial 
minorities.73 Although authorized by law, the public, as well as political 
leaders across the ideological spectrum, frequently condemn the use of 
racial profiling in ordinary criminal law enforcement.74 Such criticism, 
however, is somewhat muted when it comes to reliance on race in immi-
gration enforcement. In that context, the consideration of race is often 
treated as normal, natural, and thus justified, with the immigration 
status of Latina/os routinely considered to be suspect.75 
B. Increased State and Local Involvement in Immigration Enforcement 
Criminal law enforcement and immigration enforcement historically 
have operated as separate and independent systems housed in different 
parts of the federal, state, and local law enforcement bureaucracies.76 
 
71. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, La Migra in the Mirror: 
Immigration Enforcement and Racial Profiling on the Texas Border, 23 
Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 167, 184 (2009) (“The significance 
of the language in Brignoni-Ponce—‘Mexican appearance’—and Martinez-
Fuerte—‘of apparent Mexican ancestry’—cannot be overstated.”) (footnote 
omitted); Lupe S. Salinas & Fernando Colon-Navarro, Racial Profiling as 
a Means of Thwarting the Alleged Latino Security Threat, 37 T. Marshall 
L. Rev. 5, 8–17 (2011) (analyzing the adverse impacts of the racial profiling 
of Latina/os in law enforcement). See generally Johnson, supra note 53 
(identifying the deep and enduring impacts of Whren and Brignoni-Ponce 
on encouraging law enforcement reliance on racial profiling as a tool in criminal 
and immigration enforcement in the modern United States). 
72. See supra text accompanying note 70 (providing examples of frequent reliance 
on race in investigations by law enforcement). 
73. See supra text accompanying note 1 (noting several high-profile examples). 
74. See supra text accompanying notes 51 and 52 (describing the widespread 
criticism of racial profiling in law enforcement investigations). 
75. See supra text accompanying notes 22 and 25 (discussing the racial disparities 
in U.S. immigration enforcement and the support for these discriminatory 
practices in some areas of public discourse). 
76. For analysis of the civil rights implications of state and local police involve-
ment in federal immigration enforcement before the recent increase in state 
and local immigration enforcement efforts, see Linda Reyna Yañez & Alfonso 
Soto, Local Police Involvement in the Enforcement of Immigration Law, 1 
Hisp. L.J. 9, 12 (1994) (arguing that “unguided police action in the immi-
gration field has the potential for infringing on the rights of U.S. citizens, 
lawful residents, and aliens”). 
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Law enforcement authority traditionally has been distributed in a rela-
tively clear-cut fashion, with those agencies operating for the most part 
independently of one another. In the American federalist system, state 
and local authorities are the primary enforcers of criminal law. At least 
since the late nineteenth century, immigration enforcement has been in 
the near-exclusive hands of the federal government.77 
Strong law enforcement policy considerations favor the separation 
of criminal law and immigration enforcement functions. Few know-
ledgeable observers disagree that local police agencies are able to most 
effectively combat crime when all residents of the community, including 
lawful and undocumented immigrants (as well as minority communities 
generally), trust the police.78 A relationship of trust appears consider-
ably less likely if immigrants fear possible deportation if they report a 
crime to the police, cooperate as witnesses in police investigations, or 
otherwise interact with law enforcement officers.79 In addition, palpable 
fears of deportation and separation from family, friends, and comm-
unity, may lead to dangerous—even deadly—situations for police, crime 
suspects, and the general public when noncitizens seek to evade or resist 
arrest. Consequently, a number of police chiefs of major metropolitan 
areas with large immigrant populations have expressed the opinion that 
the cooperation of immigrant residents of the community, without fear 
of possible removal, is essential to effective criminal law enforcement.80 
 
77. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499–500 (2012) (noting the 
extensive and complex nature of federal regulation of immigration). 
78.  See infra note 80. 
79. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration 
Regulation, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 567, 604–05 (2008) (offering policy reasons 
that cities pass sanctuary laws); Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 
61 SMU L. Rev. 133, 148 (2008) (“With the threat of deportation taken out 
of the picture during police and immigrant encounters, police officers have 
stated that immigrants are more willing to report crimes.”); Developments 
in the Law: Policing, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1706, 1784–85 (2015) (“Latino comm-
unities trust police less now that police increasingly perform the functions of 
federal immigration officers.”). 
80. See Sandy Fitzgerald, San Francisco County Sheriff Defends Sanctuary Law 
After Shooting, Newsmax (July 7, 2015, 9:57 AM), http://www.newsmax. 
com/Newsfron/San-Francisco-Ross-Mirkarimi-sheriff-sanctuary/2015/07/07/ 
id/653782/ [http://perma.cc/3S7U-5A7W] (noting the San Francisco sheriff’s 
continuing support for the city’s “sanctuary ordinance” despite a murder 
allegedly committed by an undocumented immigrant released under the law); 
LAPD’s Special Order 40 on Immigrants Upheld by Court, L.A. Times 
(June 17, 2009, 4:51 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/06/ 
appeals-court-upholds-lapd-policy-on-illegal-immigrants.html [http://perma. 
cc/U9YX-M79P] (stating that a series of chiefs of the Los Angeles Police 
Department “have said [that Los Angeles Police Department Special Order 
40, which limits police inquiry into immigration status (see infra text 
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To build trust and cooperation between immigrants and local pol-
ice, a number of police departments affirmatively prohibit officers from 
making general inquiries into the immigration status of crime victims, 
witnesses, and others with whom they come into contact. The Los 
Angeles Police Department (LAPD), not particularly known for being 
soft on crime or especially proimmigrant, is a prominent example. In 
effect since 1979, LAPD Special Order 40 provides that “officers shall 
not initiate police action with the objective of discovering the alien 
status of a person.”81 This policy seeks to “increase cooperation between 
the undocumented community in Los Angeles and the LAPD, reduce 
crime, and produce a better standard of living for both undocumented 
immigrants and for the rest of the city’s population.”82 
The simple law enforcement rationale behind the LAPD policy, and 
similar laws and policies of other localities, is to decrease fear among 
immigrants that interactions with police officers might result in possible 
removal from the United States. By diminishing fears of removal, these 
laws and policies aim to promote the trust of the immigrant community 
in law enforcement officers and gain their cooperation with the police 
in law enforcement activities. 
Some localities further restrict local cooperation with federal immi-
gration authorities in the detention of noncitizens who are arrested for 
violation of the criminal laws.83 These laws and policies find support 
among law enforcement agencies as another way to build trust and 
cooperation among immigrant communities as well as to reduce the 
substantial costs of detention. 
Despite the legitimate law enforcement aims underlying policies 
that limit state and local police cooperation with federal immigration 
enforcement, the laws are often referred to generically, and, at least in 
 
accompanying note 81)] . . . encourages undocumented immigrants who 
witness crimes to assist police without fear of being deported”). 
81. Special Order No. 40 from LAPD Police Chief Daryl F. Gates (Nov. 27, 
1979), www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/SO_40.pdf [http://perma.cc/6EXB- 
CSQE]. 
82. Theodore W. Maya, Comment, To Serve and Protect or to Betray and 
Neglect?: The LAPD and Undocumented Immigrants, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 
1611, 1613 (2002); see Sturgeon v. Bratton, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1407 (2009) 
(rejecting legal challenges to Los Angeles Police Department’s Special Order 
40). See generally Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies: Consti-
tutional and Representative of Good Policing and Good Public Policy, 2 U.C. 
Irvine L. Rev. 247, 297–308 (2012) (articulating effective policing and other 
policy reasons for the various state and local “sanctuary” laws and policies). 
83. See infra text accompanying notes 110–115(discussing the national controversy 
generated by a highly publicized case involving the release of an undocumented 
immigrant under the San Francisco “sanctuary ordinance” who later allegedly 
committed a murder). 
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some quarters, disparagingly, as “sanctuary laws.”84 That moniker con-
tributes to the widely held perception that cities with policies limiting 
the extent of cooperation with federal immigration authorities provide 
illegitimate refuge to immigrants and thus represent a form of defiance 
of the federal immigration laws. The designation of these laws as “sanc-
tuary laws” in effect obfuscates the legitimate law enforcement justif-
ications for the policies. 
A number of contemporary developments have eroded the trad-
itional separation of law enforcement and immigration enforcement 
authority in the United States and dramatically increased the role of 
state and local law enforcement agencies in federal immigration remov-
al. All are designed to bolster immigration enforcement and increase 
noncitizen removals. All negatively impact Latina/o immigrants. 
1. Section 287(g) Agreements 
Contrary to the long historical practice, recent years have seen a 
dramatic increase in direct state and local involvement in the enforce-
ment of the federal immigration laws.85 A major erosion of the wall of  
84. See Villazor, supra note 79, at 148–50, 155–56 (describing the variety of 
“sanctuary laws” and the negative connotation of the term “sanctuary”). 
For a review of the evolution of state and local “sanctuary” laws, see Stella 
Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 Ohio St. L.J. 703, 735–
43 (2013); see also Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? 
Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 
1373, 1388–91 (2006) (summarizing various types of state and local laws 
limiting cooperation with federal immigration enforcement authorities); 
Natashia Tidwell, Fragmenting the Community: Immigration Enforcement 
and the Unintended Consequences of Local Police Non-Cooperation Policies, 
88 St. John’s L. Rev. 105 (2014) (examining the consequences of local 
policies restricting police cooperation with federal immigration authorities); 
Stephanie M. Gomes, Note, Building TRUST in Our Communities: States 
Encourage Their Residents to Speak Up in the Wake of the Federal 
Government’s Silence, 33 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 715 (2015) (calling for the 
reduction of state and local law enforcement involvement in federal immi-
gration enforcement); infra Part I.B.2. (discussing the increase in state and 
local government resistance to cooperation with federal immigration enforce-
ment authorities). 
85. See Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and 
the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 Duke L.J. 
1563, 1579–98 (2010) (analyzing various programs that have increased the 
cooperation between federal, state, and local governments in immigration 
enforcement); Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State Non-
cooperation and Sanctuary Cities after Secure Communities, 91 Chi.-Kent 
L. Rev. 13 (2016) (to a similar effect); Juliet P. Stumpf, D(E)Volving 
Discretion: Lessons from the Life and Times of Secure Communities, 64 
Am. U. L. Rev. 1259 (2015) (studying efforts through Secure Communities 
and other programs to redistribute immigration enforcement authority from 
the federal government to state and local law enforcement agencies); Juliet 
P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over 
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1557 (2008) (detailing the emergence of state 
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separation between state and local criminal law enforcement and federal 
immigration enforcement began in earnest with 1996 immigration re-
forms. Those reforms, designed to bolster enforcement and removals of 
“criminal aliens,” included the creation of a new immigration enforce-
ment program pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act Section 
287(g).86 Under what are called Section 287(g) agreements entered into 
by federal, state, and local governments (many if not most of which the 
U.S. government later cancelled), federal immigration authorities pro-
vided training in federal immigration law and its enforcement to state 
and local police. After receiving that training, state and local law enfor-
cement officers were authorized to affirmatively assist federal immigra-
tion authorities in enforcing the nation’s immigration laws. 
As part of its overall strategy to bolster immigration enforcement, 
the Bush administration entered into many Section 287(g) agreements 
with state and local governments.87 Some observers argued that such 
agreements resulted in an increase in racial profiling of Latina/os as 
state and local law enforcement agencies aggressively sought to facili-
tate the enforcement of federal immigration law.88 
2. Secure Communities, the Rise of “Sanctuary Cities,” and  
the Priority Enforcement Program 
Moving away from reliance on Section 287(g) agreements, the 
Obama administration opted instead for an efficient alternative known 
 
and local involvement in federal immigration enforcement and the problems 
resulting from that development). See generally Hiroshi Motomura, The 
Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local 
Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1819 (2011) (assessing 
critically the increased state and local government involvement in federal 
immigration enforcement). 
86. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012) 
(authorizing the Attorney General to “enter into a written agreement with a 
State” or locality to permit state or local law enforcement officers to “perform 
the function of an immigration officer”). 
87. See Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 
N.C. L. Rev. 1619, 1633–42 (2008) (analyzing a variety of forms of direct 
regulation of immigration by state and local governments); Nicholas D. 
Michaud, Note, From 287(g) to SB 1070: The Decline of the Federal 
Immigration Partnership and the Rise of State-Level Immigration Enforce-
ment, 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 1083 (2010) (reviewing the evolution of the § 287(g) 
program and contending that deficiencies in its implementation led to the 
dramatic increase in state and local immigration enforcement initiatives). 
88. See, e.g., Carrie L. Arnold, Note, Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforce-
ment: State and Local Agreements to Enforce Federal Immigration Law, 
49 Ariz. L. Rev. 113, 116 (2007) (“[T]he federal training provided through 
the [§ 287(g)] program will not prevent racial profiling by [local law enforce-
ment] officers.”). 
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as the “Secure Communities” program.89 Although still relying on state 
criminal justice systems to facilitate the removal of criminal non-
citizens, that program limited state and local police discretion in immi-
gration enforcement.  
Secure Communities required state and local law enforcement agen-
cies to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement authorities.90 
State and local police agencies were specifically instructed to share 
information with the federal government about noncitizens who were 
arrested. They were further required to place immigration “holds” on 
(i.e., detain) noncitizens so that federal immigration authorities had the 
time necessary, if they so desired, to take custody of the noncitizens for 
possible removal.91 
Secure Communities facilitated the removals of large numbers of 
noncitizens, including both lawful permanent residents and undocumen-
ted immigrants, who had been arrested for serious and minor crimes.92 
 
89. For explanations about the operation of Secure Communities, see Hing, supra 
note 82 at 310–11; Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L. 
Rev. 149, 207–08 (2013); Ramos, supra note 34, at 319–21; Steven Papazian, 
Note, Secure Communities, Sanctuary Laws, and Local Enforcement of 
Immigration Law: The Story of Los Angeles, 21 Rev. L. & Soc. Just. 283, 
300–04 (2012).  
90. Although initially wavering on the issue, the U.S. government eventually 
took the firm position that state and local law enforcement agencies were 
required to participate in Secure Communities. Many states and localities 
originally had understood that participation in the program was voluntary 
in nature. The difference of opinion provoked considerable controversy. See 
Christine N. Cimini, Hands Off Our Fingerprints: State, Local, and Individual 
Defiance of Federal Immigration Enforcement, 47 Conn. L. Rev. 101, 105–
11 (2014) (“Without the localities [sic] ability to formally opt-out, govern-
mental and individual voices of resistance emerged.”); see also Trevor George 
Gardner, The Promise and Peril of the Anti-Commandeering Rule in the 
Homeland Security Era: Immigrant Sanctuary as an Illustrative Case, 34 
St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 313 (2015) (examining the constitutional 
questions raised by the efforts of the U.S. government to mandate state and 
local assistance in immigration enforcement). 
91. See supra note 89 (citing authorities explaining the operation of Secure 
Communities). 
92. See Editorial, Immigration Bait and Switch, N.Y. Times (Aug. 17, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/18/opinion/18wed3.html?_r=0 [http:// 
perma.cc/KCV3-MMS8] (“Immigration and Customs Enforcement records 
show that a vast majority, 79 percent, of people deported under Secure 
Communities had no criminal records or had been picked up for low-level 
offenses, like traffic violations and juvenile mischief.”) (emphasis added); 
Kavitha Rajagopalan, Deportation Program Casts Too Wide a Net, Newsday 
(New York), June 24, 2011, at A34 (“Secure Communities purports to search 
for repeat illegal immigrant offenders or those charged with major crimes. 
In practice, most people deported under the program have had no criminal 
record at all and were picked up on minor offenses, like speeding.”) (emphasis 
added); Thompson & Cohen, supra note 9 (reviewing statistical data on the 
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Criminal arrests, not convictions, of noncitizens were the touchstone of 
the program. Aggressive implementation of Secure Communities result-
ed in a spike in removals to record highs of approximately 400,000 non-
citizens a year in the first six years of the Obama presidency.93 The 
administration widely publicizing the removal records.94 It was much 
less well known that almost all of the persons removed from the United 
States under Secure Communities were Latina/o.95 
Consider the following jarring statistics. Total removals of non-
citizens by the U.S. government reached an all-time high of 438,421 in 
2013, a jump of at least ten-fold from the total annual removals in the 
 
removal from the United States of many noncitizens arrested for minor 
crimes); see also Daniel Kanstroom, Smart(er) Enforcement: Rethinking 
Removal, Structuring Proportionality, and Imagining Graduated Sanctions, 
30 J.L. & Pol. 465 (2015) (contending, among other things, that the U.S. 
government should de-emphasize the removal of long-term lawful permanent 
residents). 
 For critical analysis of the impacts of the Secure Communities program, see 
Aarti Kohli, Peter L. Markowitz & Lisa Chavez, Secure Comm-
unities by the Numbers: An Analysis of Demographics and Due 
Process, Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social 
Policy, UC Berkeley (Oct. 2011), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/ 
Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf [http://perma.cc/TX39-AYMP]; 
Rachel R. Ray, Insecure Communities: Examining Local Government Partici-
pation in US Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s “Secure Communities” 
Program, 10 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 327, 337–38 (2011). 
93. See, e.g., Brian Bennett, U.S. Deported Record Number of Illegal Immigrants, 
L.A. Times (Oct. 6, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/06/nation/ 
la-na-illegal-immigration-20101007 [http://perma.cc/43PT-Z2CQ] (“Of the 
392,862 deportations from October 2009 through September of this year, 
about half were illegal immigrants with criminal records. The total was about 
3,000 more deportations than the record set in the previous year.”). 
94. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Deportation Up in 2013; Border Sites were Focus, 
N.Y. Times (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/us/ 
deportation-up-in-2013-border-sites-were-focus.html [http://perma.cc/3K6Y-
UHSA] (discussing the U.S. government’s annual report on immigration 
enforcement). In publicizing the high numbers of removals, the administration 
apparently acted on the belief that demonstrating a commitment to enforce-
ment through increased removals might help convince Congress to pass 
comprehensive immigration reform legislation. See supra text accompanying 
notes 16 and 17 (“Well-publicized increases in the number of immigrant 
removals have been the centerpiece of nothing less than a sustained political 
campaign to convince Congress to enact comprehensive immigration reform, 
for which the President has repeatedly expressed support.”) (citations omitted). 
95. See Ramos, supra note 34, at 328–29 (“[I]f undocumented has come to mean 
illegal, then illegal has come to mean Mexican.”); Rosenbaum, supra note 34, 
at 495–96 (“From the inception of Secure Communities to approximately 2011, 
93% of those identified as removable through Secure Communities were 
Latinos, while only 77% of the undocumented population was Latino.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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1990s: “Mexican nationals accounted for 72 percent of all aliens re-
moved. . . . The next leading countries were Guatemala (11 percent), 
Honduras (8.3 percent), and El Salvador (4.7 percent). These four coun-
tries accounted for 96 percent of all removals.”96 Removals tended to 
fall primarily on male noncitizens, who accounted for more than ninety 
percent of all persons deported from 2003–13.97 These statistics are en-
tirely consistent with an immigration removal system that targets non-
citizens who come into contact with state and local law enforcement 
authorities, which in turn target Latino males in criminal law enforce-
ment efforts.98 In essence, “[c]rimmigration has been responsible for the 
mass removal of Latinos living in the United States, most significantly 
poor Latinos from Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.”99 
Moreover, immigrant detentions, which federal law generally re-
quires for many noncitizens convicted of crimes,100 reflect similar racial 
disparities. In 2013, “90% of [the immigrants detained] were from just 
four Latin-American countries: Mexico (56 percent), Guatemala, Hon-
duras, and El Salvador.”101 In addition, federal criminal immigration 
 
96. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. & Office of Immigration Statistics, 
Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2013 6 (2014) (emphasis added), 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_ 
2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/ST5B-PLYV]. 
97. Migration Policy Inst., MPI Report Offers Most Detailed 
Analysis Yet of U.S. Deportation System under DHS; Examines 
Criminality, Origin, Gender & More of Deportees (2014), http:// 
www.migrationpolicy.org/news/mpi-report-offers-most-detailed-analysis-yet-
us-deportation-system-under-dhs-examines [http://perma.cc/SW6Q-T562]. 
Women immigrants constitute a larger portion of the overall immigrant 
population than their percentage of removals. See Llezlie Green Coleman, 
Explored at the Intersection: A Critical Race Feminist Analysis of Undocu-
mented Latina Workers and the Role of the Private Attorney General, 22 
Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 397, 400–02 (2015) (discussing “the feminization 
of immigration”). 
98. See Vázquez, supra note 29, at 646–47 (“By allowing state and local govern-
ments to be the pipeline through which federal immigration law is enforced, 
racial bias can manipulate the overall outcomes of those who are removed.”) 
(footnote omitted); see also Olivares, supra note 18, at 36–43 (arguing that 
the conception that the “immigrant [is] a person of color” has significantly 
influenced U.S. government’s immigration enforcement priorities). 
99. Vázquez, supra note 29, at 654 (footnote omitted). 
100. See supra text accompanying note 91 (“[State and local police agencies] 
were . . . required to place immigration ‘holds’ on (i.e., detain) noncitizens 
so that federal immigration authorities had the time necessary, if they so 
desired, to take custody of the noncitizens for possible removal.”). 
101. Olivares, supra note 18, at 41 (footnote omitted); see Ingrid V. Eagly & 
Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 
164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 46 (Figure 13) (showing that detention rates of non-
citizens from Latin America were by far the highest of all countries). 
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prosecutions, which have increased dramatically in the last decade, are 
overwhelmingly directed at Latina/o immigrants.102 
Concerned with the overbroad impacts, negative public safety imp-
lications, and the sheer costs of detention of noncitizens for possible 
removal by the federal government, some states and localities began to 
resist full cooperation with the federal government in immigration en-
forcement.103 Over time, increasing numbers of states and localities 
passed laws that restrict state and local law enforcement cooperation 
with U.S. immigration authorities with respect to the removal of certain 
nonserious criminal offenders.104 One commentator observed that 
[a] remarkably large number of jurisdictions across the United 
States have followed some form of sanctuary policy. Jurisdictions 
within the United States that have, or previously had, adopted 
some form of sanctuary policy include: Anchorage and Fairbanks, 
Alaska; Chandler and Phoenix, Arizona; Fresno, San Diego, the 
City and County of San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Sonoma 
County, California; Chicago, Evanston, and Cicero, Illinois; Or-
leans and Cambridge, Massachusetts; Portland, Maine; Baltimore 
and Takoma Park, Maryland; Ann Arbor and Detroit, Michigan; 
Minneapolis, Minnesota; Durham, North Carolina; Albuquerque, 
 
102. See Rodolfo D. Saenz, Note, Another Sort of Wall-Building: How 
Crimmigration Affects Latino Perceptions of Immigration Law, 28 Geo. 
Immigr. L.J. 477, 488–89 (2014) (citing statistics demonstrating the disparate 
impacts on Latina/os of federal criminal immigration prosecutions); see 
also Kit Johnson, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Federal Prosecution of 
Immigration Crimes, 92 Denv. U. L. Rev. 863 (2015) (analyzing the optimal 
level of incarceration for federal immigration crimes). 
103. See infra text accompanying notes 104–107 (“Over time, increasing numbers 
of states and localities passed laws that restrict state and local law enforcement 
cooperation with U.S. immigration authorities with respect to the removal 
of certain non-serious criminal offenders.”) (footnote omitted). 
104. See, e.g., California Trust Act, A.B. 4, 2013–2014 Cal. Legis. (Cal. 2013) 
(enacted) (limiting state and local law enforcement cooperation with the U.S. 
government with respect to noncitizens arrested for minor crimes); Lasch, 
supra note 89, at 154–63 (describing the efforts of various localities to resist 
participation in the Secure Communities program). For analysis of state and 
local resistance to participation in Secure Communities, see Cimini, supra 
note 90, at 131–47 (describing methods and legal implications of local 
resistance to the obligation of states to comply with federal immigration 
detainers); Lasch, supra note 89, at 162–63, 207–16 (describing the purposes 
and legal justifications for local resistance to Secure Communities, with a focus 
on Santa Clara). An empirical study places in question whether the operation 
of Secure Communities in fact hindered state and local law enforcement 
efforts. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Legitimacy and Cooperation: 
Will Immigrants Cooperate With Local Police who Enforce Federal 
Immigration Law? (Close-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 
734, Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 543, 2015), http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2658265 [http://perma.cc/FN84-9DSM]. 
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Aztec, Rio Arriba County, and Santa Fe, New Mexico; Newark, 
New Jersey; New York City, New York; Ashland, Gaston, and 
Marion County, Oregon; Austin, Houston, and Katy, Texas; Sea-
ttle, Washington; and Madison, Wisconsin.105 
State and local resistance to federal immigration enforcement ulti-
mately contributed to the Obama administration’s decision to dismant-
le Secure Communities. As Department of Homeland Security Secretary 
Jeh Johnson candidly explained, the abolition of the “controversial Sec-
ure Communities program” responded to “[a] rapidly expanding list of 
city, county and state governments” enacting laws that restricted co-
operation with federal immigration enforcement.106 The elimination of 
Secure Communities was overshadowed in the public eye by the simul-
taneous announcement of an expanded deferred action program that 
provoked a national controversy as well as legal challenges by twenty-
six states that have indefinitely delayed its implementation.107 
When Secure Communities was in operation, the U.S. government 
aggressively sought to remove small-time criminal offenders from the 
United States as well as noncitizens convicted of more serious criminal 
offenses.108 Far from rubber-stamping the U.S. government’s aggressive 
removal efforts, a relatively conservative Supreme Court has regular-
ly—and somewhat surprisingly—rejected removal orders that it conclu-
ded were inconsistent with the U.S. immigration laws.109  
105. Michael J. Davidson, Sanctuary: A Modern Legal Anachronism, 42 Cap. 
U. L. Rev. 583, 609–11 (2014) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
106. Statement by Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Charles Johnson, U.S. 
House of Representatives, Comm. on the Judiciary (July 14, 2015), http:// 
docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20150714/103734/HHRG-114-JU00-
Wstate-JohnsonJ-20150714.pdf [http://perma.cc/9SSV-KNDX]; see Michael 
Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 Geo. 
L.J. 125 (2015) (examining demise of Secure Communities in light of consti-
tutional concerns with the use of criminal law in immigration enforcement). 
107. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming a prelim-
inary injunction prohibiting the implementation of an expanded deferred 
action program proposed by the Obama administration), cert. granted, 136 
S. Ct. 906 (2016). For discussion of the legal issues arising from executive 
discretion in the deferred action program, see Michael Kagan, A Taxonomy 
of Discretion: Refining the Legality Debate About Obama’s Executive Actions 
on Immigration, 92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1083 (2015). 
108. See supra text accompanying note 92 (“Secure Communities facilitated the 
removals of large numbers of noncitizens, including lawful permanent residents 
as well as undocumented immigrants, who had been arrested for minor, as 
well as serious, crimes.”) (footnote omitted). 
109. See, e.g., Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1983 (2014) (setting aside a 
removal order following a drug paraphernalia conviction based on possession 
of a sock used to conceal a prescription drug); Moncrieffe v. Holder 133 S. 
Ct. 1678 (2013) (same for conviction based on simple possession of a small 
amount of marijuana); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 566 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 4·2016 
Doubling Down on Racial Discrimination 
1020 
In 2015, “sanctuary laws”110 made the national news after the San 
Francisco Sheriff’s Office released an undocumented immigrant under 
such a law and he allegedly committed murder.111 Originally passed in 
1989, the San Francisco “Sanctuary Ordinance,” in relevant part, pro-
vides that: 
No department, agency, commission, officer or employee of the 
City and County of San Francisco shall use any City funds or 
resources to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration law 
or to gather or disseminate information regarding the immigration 
status of individuals in the City and County of San Francisco 
unless such assistance is required by federal or State statute, regu-
lation or court decision.112 
Pursuant to the ordinance, the San Francisco Sheriff’s Office re-
leased an undocumented immigrant from Mexico with many criminal 
convictions and previous deportations and unlawful re-entries into the 
United States; he later was charged with the murder of a woman on the 
 
(prescription drug possession conviction); Lopez v Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 
50 (2006) (conviction for aiding and abetting possession of drugs); infra text 
accompanying notes 141–145, 153–156 (discussing these decisions); see also 
Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New 
Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 Okla. L. Rev. 57 (2015) 
(analyzing the Supreme Court’s immigration decisions from the 2009–13 
Terms and showing that immigrants prevailed in many of the cases). 
 In addition, the Court, no doubt influenced by a large number of appeals of 
removal orders based on criminal convictions, held in the landmark decision 
of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359–60 (2010), that an ineffective assist-
ance of counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment could be based on defense 
counsel’s failure to inform a noncitizen criminal defendant of the possibility 
of removal resulting from a criminal conviction under a plea agreement. 
110. See supra text accompanying note 77–81 (describing the term “sanctuary laws”). 
111. See Jennifer Medina & Julia Preston, After Killing Tied to Deported Felon, 
San Francisco Mayor Mulls Policy Shift, N.Y. Times (July 8, 2015), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/us/gun-used-in-san-francisco-killing-was-stolen- 
from-federal-agent.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/7LTC-XY46] (describing the 
criticism of San Francisco’s sanctuary ordinance following the alleged murder 
of a woman by an undocumented immigrant released from police custody). 
112. City and County of S.F. Administrative Code § 12H.2 (1989), http:// 
sfgov.org/sfc/sanctuary/index_1069_b3ff.html?page=1069 [http://perma.cc/ 
ZMR7-RZ3K]. For analysis of the San Francisco ordinance, see Pratheepan 
Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Policies & Immigration 
Federalism: A Dialectical Analysis, 55 Wayne L. Rev. 1683, 1687–91 (2009). 
The ordinance’s restriction of the use of “City funds or resources to assist 
in the enforcement of federal immigration law” reflects San Francisco’s budget-
ary concerns with detaining noncitizens on behalf of the federal government. 
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San Francisco waterfront.113 This tragedy attracted national publicity114 
and led to calls by members of Congress to pass legislation discouraging 
the passage of “sanctuary laws” by state and local governments.115 
When the Obama Administration ended Secure Communities in 
2014, it simultaneously announced the creation of the “Priority Enforce-
ment Program” (PEP). The stated intent of the new program is to 
refocus removal efforts on the most serious criminal immigrant offend-
ers; PEP restricts requests for immigration “holds” to noncitizens act-
ually convicted of serious crimes rather than merely arrested for any 
crime.116 
Although the new program is more focused than Secure Comm-
unities, the racially disparate impacts on removals of the American jus-
tice system will almost assuredly continue with the U.S. government’s 
reliance on criminal convictions for removals in the new PEP. This 
results from the fact that race thoroughly permeates the criminal justice 
systems of the federal, state, and local governments, and often plays a 
pivotal role in determining who is convicted of, as well as arrested for, 
crimes.117 
Other federal programs viewed as protecting certain groups of im-
migrants also have legitimate law enforcement aims. Announced in 
 
113. Medina & Preston, supra note 111. 
114. Republican presidential contender Donald Trump made headlines with claims 
that the incident supported his view that Mexican immigrants were committ-
ing crimes on a massive scale, which in turn required aggressive responses such 
as a more secure U.S.–Mexico border and otherwise more rigorous border 
enforcement, including mass deportations. See Sanchez, supra note 8 (“Mr. 
Trump called the shooting ‘a senseless and totally preventable act of violence 
committed by an illegal immigrant’ and said it showed the need for a wall 
to be built along the 2,000 mile US-Mexican border.”). 
115. Editorial, The Great ‘Sanctuary City’ Slander, N.Y. Times (Oct. 16, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/17/opinion/the-great-sanctuary-city-
slander.html?mtrref=undefined&gwh=BB5B425A79D475469250A02C9C
A97126&gwt=pay&assetType=opinion [http://perma.cc/2KCK-E9CL]; 
Jordain Carney, Senate Republicans Push to Punish ‘Sanctuary Cities,’ 
The Hill (July 11, 2015, 4:28 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/ 
senate/247592-senate-republicans-push-to-punish-sanctuary-cities [http:// 
perma.cc/C4DW-8GES].  
116. Memorandum to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enf’t, Megan Mack, Officer, Office of Civil Rights & Civil 
Liberties, Philip A. McNamara, Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental 
Affairs, from Jeh Charles Johnson, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec 
2–3 (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 
14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf [http://perma.cc/3QMK-Q69B]. 
117. See supra Part I.A. (reviewing developments in criminal removals with 
accompanying racial impacts). 
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2012, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program118 
makes certain undocumented noncitizens without serious criminal 
convictions eligible to apply for a type of limited temporary relief from 
removal known as “deferred action,” which constitutes a form of 
prosecutorial discretion in deciding which noncitizens to target for 
removal.119 One of the less intuitive rationales for the program, which 
some observers decried as an unlawful “amnesty” of undocumented im-
migrants, was to promote public safety. The program sought to remove 
noncitizens without significant criminal problems from the U.S. govern-
ment’s removal efforts. The hope, in turn, was to allow the federal gov-
ernment to focus limited immigration enforcement resources on the re-
moval of criminal offenders.120 The expanded deferred action program 
proposed by the Obama administration in 2014, which has not yet been 
fully implemented, serves similar law enforcement goals.121 
3. State and Local Immigration Enforcement Laws 
Responding to the popularity of increased immigration enforcement 
as well as growing public frustration with federal enforcement efforts, a 
number of state legislatures passed laws ostensibly designed to facilitate 
enforcement of the U.S. immigration laws.122 One of the most well- 
118. See Consideration of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), 
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., http://www.uscis.gov/ 
humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca [http:// 
perma.cc/PR4B-3ZFY] (last updated Jan. 4, 2016) (describing DACA). 
119. See Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred: Deferred Action, Prosecutorial 
Discretion, and the Vexing Case(s) of Dream Act Students, 21 Wm. & Mary 
Bill Rts. J. 463 (2012) (describing deferred action). See generally Shoba 
Sivaprasad Wadhia, Beyond Deportation: The Role of Prosecu-
torial Discretion in Immigration Cases (2015) (analyzing the history 
of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion through deferred action and other 
mechanisms by the U.S. government in American immigration enforcement). 
For commentary questioning the scope of discretion exercised by the Obama 
administration in its deferred action programs, see Peter Margulies, The 
Boundaries of Executive Discretion: Deferred Action, Unlawful Presence, 
and Immigration Law, 64 Am. U. L. Rev. 1183 (2015). 
120. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, 
on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who 
Came to the United States as Children 1 (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came- 
to-us-as-children.pdf [http://perma.cc/8PRB-PGHQ] (stating the necessity 
of ensuring that “enforcement resources are not expended” on “low priority 
cases”); see also Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 Fordham 
L. Rev. 661 (2015) (contending that the Obama administration’s deferred 
action programs can be properly understood as adding necessary discretion 
to the removal system). 
121. See supra text accompanying note 106 and 107.  
122. See Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 
21 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 577, 606 (2012) (“[W]ith the explosion of 
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known examples is Section 2(B) of Arizona’s S.B. 1070, a tough-minded 
state immigration enforcement measure that commenced a trend of 
similar laws in other states. The law requires local police to verify the 
immigration status of persons who they reasonably suspect are in the 
United States in violation of the federal immigration laws.123 Little guid-
ance is provided about how state and local police should make that 
determination. 
Some commentators feared that the implementation of Section 2(B) 
would increase the prevalence of racial profiling of Latina/os by state 
and local law enforcement officers in the name of immigration enforce-
ment.124 Despite those concerns, the Supreme Court declined to find 
that the section on its face was preempted by federal law; consequently, 
 
sub-federal involvement in immigration policing, it seems that states and 
localities, in many cases, actually exercise the discretion that definitively 
shapes federal enforcement.”); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil 
Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate Immigration, 46 Ga. L. Rev. 609 
(2012) (considering the possible adverse civil rights impacts of state and local 
immigration enforcement laws). See generally Strange Neighbors: The 
Role of States in Immigration Policy (Carissa Byrne Hessick & Gabriel 
J. Chin eds., 2014) (analyzing from a variety of perspectives the emergence 
and impacts of the growing number of state and local immigration enforce-
ment laws). 
123. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507–10 (2012) (analyzing the 
constitutionality of § 2(B) of S.B. 1070). 
124. See, e.g., Kristina M. Campbell, (Un)Reasonable Suspicion: Racial Profiling 
in Immigration Enforcement After Arizona v. United States, 3 Wake Forest 
J.L. & Pol’y 367, 388–94 (2013) (analyzing how enforcement of § 2(B) in 
Arizona has increased racial profiling); Marjorie Cohn, Racial Profiling 
Legalized in Arizona, 1 Colum. J. Race & L. 168, 170 (2012) (explaining 
how the enforcement of S.B. 1070 will require racial profiling); Andrea 
Christina Nill, Latinos and S.B. 1070: Demonization, Dehumanization, and 
Disenfranchisement, 14 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 35, 49–52 (2011) (summarizing 
the nature of lawsuits claiming that the full implementation of S.B. 1070 
would cause widespread racial profiling and that many people of color would 
be subjected to unlawful interrogations, searches, and arrests); David A. 
Selden et al., Placing S.B. 1070 and Racial Profiling into Context, and What 
S.B. 1070 Reveals About the Legislative Process in Arizona, 43 Ariz. St. L.J. 
523, 525–43 (2011) (analyzing lawsuits brought over S.B. 1070 and racial 
profiling); see also Karla Mari McKanders, Federal Preemption and 
Immigrants’ Rights, 3 Wake Forest J.L. & Pol’y 333, 334 (2013) 
(discussing the debate over whether the Supreme Court’s refusal in Arizona 
v. United States to invalidate § 2(B) of S.B. 1070 will result in greater racial 
profiling of Latina/os); Barbara E. Armacost, Immigration Policing: Federal-
izing the Local, (Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper 
No. 2014-60, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2504042 [http://perma.cc/YWJ2-22LW] (contending that the increased role 
of state and local law enforcement agencies in immigration enforcement results 
in greater racial profiling of minorities). 
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Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 is currently in effect in Arizona.125 A number 
of other states have enacted laws with provisions similar to Section 
2(B), which courts have upheld.126 In addition to the demand of the 
general public for increased enforcement of the federal immigration 
laws, antipathy for Latina/os and immigrants contributed to the enact-
ment of the state and local immigration enforcement laws.127 
4. The Modern Criminal Removal System 
One commentator aptly summarized the contemporary develop-
ments in American immigration enforcement as follows: 
[t]he deportation of “criminal aliens” is now the driving force in 
American immigration enforcement. In recent years, the Con-
gress, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland 
Security, and the White House have all placed criminals front and 
center in establishing immigration enforcement priorities . . . . 
In effect, federal immigration enforcement has become a criminal 
removal system.128 
 
125. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507–10. The Court left open the possibility of “as 
applied” challenges to § 2(B) based on allegedly impermissible discrimination 
in individual cases. Id. Despite its refusal to invalidate § 2(B) on its face, 
the Court held that three other core provisions of S.B. 1070 were preempted 
by federal immigration law. See id. at 2501–07. 
126. See, e.g., United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1283–85 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(upholding a section of the Alabama immigration-enforcement law similar 
to § 2(B) of Arizona’s S.B. 1070); see also Ga. Latino All. for Human Rights 
v. Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding the same for 
a Georgia immigration-enforcement law). 
127. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson & Joanna E. Cuevas Ingram, Anatomy of a 
Modern-Day Lynching: The Relationship Between Hate Crimes Against 
Latina/os and the Debate over Immigration Reform, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1613, 
1628–29 (2013) (summarizing a contentious political campaign, with unquest-
ionably anti-Latina/o and anti-immigrant overtones, culminating in the 
passage of a controversial immigration enforcement ordinance by the city of 
Hazleton, Pennsylvania). See generally Kristina M. Campbell, A Dry Hate: 
White Supremacy and Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric in the Humanitarian Crisis 
on the U.S.–Mexico Border, 117 W. Va. L. Rev. 1081 (2015) (analyzing the 
history of anti-Latina/o and nativist sentiment in the Southwest border region). 
128. Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation 
in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1126, 1128 (2013) (emphasis added) 
(footnotes omitted); see Eagly, supra note 37, at 1281–82 (“The criminal 
prosecution of immigration—principally for illegal entry and reentry, alien 
smuggling, and document fraud—has reached an all-time high. . . . 
Immigration, which now constitutes over half of the federal criminal workload, 
has eclipsed all other areas of federal prosecution. Noncitizens have become 
the face of federal prisons.”) (footnotes omitted); Developments in the Law, 
supra note 79, at 1772 (“What was once a civil-enforcement regime has 
developed alongside the modern criminalization, enforcement, and incarcer-
ation regime. It is now executed by federal, state, and local officers. It is the 
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Concern over the growing Latina/o populations in regions of the 
United States that previously had seen relatively little Latina/o migra-
tion, including the South and Midwest, significantly fueled the political 
efforts toward increased state and local involvement in federal immigra-
tion enforcement and the emergence of the full-fledged “criminal remov-
al system” that prevails today.129 As previously discussed,130 police offi-
cers routinely rely on race in ordinary criminal law enforcement. With 
immigration enforcement today closely tied to state and local criminal 
law enforcement activities, removals have fallen overwhelmingly on Lat-
ina/o immigrants.131 
II. Doubling Down on Race-Based Law Enforcement: 
The Modern Criminal Removal State 
The racially disparate consequences of the modern criminal justice 
system132 contribute to the racially disparate incidence of contemporary 
immigration removals.133 Consistent with modern sensibilities and con-
temporary legal doctrine,134 both systems (but especially the immigra-
tion removal system) today are in many respects facially neutral and, 
unlike past incarnations of immigration law, do not expressly target 
noncitizens of any particular race or nationality. However, both systems 
in operation have overwhelmingly negative impacts on Latina/os.135 
 
majority of federal criminal work. It shares the goals of criminal enforcement: 
immigration enforcement is used to manage crime, and criminal enforcement 
is used to manage immigration.”) (footnotes omitted). 
129. See supra text accompanying note 128 (discussing the criminal prosecution 
of immigrants).  
130. See supra Part I.A. (contending that the decisions in Whren and Brignoni-
Ponce have contributed to law-enforcement officers’ reliance on race).  
131. See supra Part I.B.1–3. (analyzing how policy aimed at removing “criminal 
aliens” had a disproportionate impact on Latina/o immigrants).  
132. See supra Part I. (explaining how the laws and enforcement policies have 
created a modern criminal justice system that disproportionately affects 
minorities). 
133. See supra text accompanying notes 37–48 (highlighting literature that exam-
ines the racial impacts of immigration policies). 
134. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1 (1991) (examining how “color-blindness” approach to Equal Pro-
tection law contributes to the maintenance of racial inequality). 
135. See Mary Fan, Post-Racial Proxy Battles Over Immigration, in Strange 
Neighbors, supra note 122, at 229 (contending that state immigration 
enforcement laws serve as “a proxy to vent resurgent [racial] anxieties” in 
American society). See generally Kevin R. Johnson, A Case Study of Color-
Blindness: The Racially Disparate Impacts of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and the 
Failure of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 2 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 313 
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Through the operation of programs such as Secure Communities 
and the Priority Enforcement Program, the criminal justice system 
feeds large numbers of noncitizens into the immigration removal mach-
inery. This exacerbates the racially disparate impacts of the criminal 
justice system on communities of color, especially Latina/os.136 The 
linkage also has significantly increased the consequences of an inter-
action of noncitizens—who are disproportionately Latina/o—with the 
criminal justice system.137 
One cannot deny the racial impacts of the contemporary focus of 
removals on noncitizens with criminal problems.138 The challenges, how-
ever, by legal scholars and activists to the criminal grounds for removal 
and enforcement programs such as Secure Communities, have tended 
to focus primarily on the sheer unfairness of large-scale removals of 
immigrants for brushes with the law. They do not specifically challenge 
the racially disparate consequences of the removal efforts.139 Despite the 
fact that Latina/os today constitute the overwhelming number of non-
citizens deported, race in immigration removals is not discussed in the 
public debate over immigration removals in the same way that it is in 
connection with modern criminal law enforcement.140 
A number of cases illustrate the racially disparate impacts of allow-
ing criminal law enforcement to feed into immigration enforcement. In 
Moncrieffe v. Holder,141 a black immigrant from Jamaica on a short trip 
to visit his daughter became caught up in what by all appearances was 
a local drug enforcement operation. A traffic stop while he was driving 
on an interstate highway in a small Georgia town, and the subsequent 
questioning, arrest, and criminal conviction all appear to have been 
influenced by the fact that the driver and passenger of the vehicle in 
 
(2012) (analyzing racially disparate impacts of color-blind immigration laws, 
such as Arizona’s S.B. 1070, and their enforcement). 
136. See supra Part I.B.2. 
137. See supra text accompanying notes 96–102 (analyzing disparate impacts 
on Latina/os of immigration removals and detention). 
138. See supra text accompanying notes 96–102. 
139. See, e.g., A Price Too High: US Families Torn Apart by Deportations for 
Drug Offenses, Hum. Rts. Watch (June 16, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/ 
report/2015/06/16/price-too-high/us-families-torn-apart-deportations-drug-
offenses [http://perma.cc/5VQT-MQGS] (discussing how immigrants are 
harshly affected by criminal prosecutions for drug offenses). 
140. See supra text accompanying notes 27–31 (noting scholarship addressing 
immigration enforcement without focusing on racial issues). 
141. 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013). 
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question were black males.142 Adrian Moncrieffe was ultimately con-
victed in Georgia state court for possession of a small amount of mari-
juana, which has been decriminalized in a growing number of states, 
and the U.S. government subsequently sought to remove him from the 
United States.143 Finding that Moncrieffe’s removal was not authorized 
by the federal immigration statute, the Supreme Court set aside the 
removal order.144 
Although Moncrieffe v. Holder involved a black man, a significant 
number of similar cases involve Latina/os. That directly results from 
the fact that law enforcement in many parts of the country target Lat-
ina/os for criminal law enforcement activities.145 Enforcement efforts 
include racial profiling of Latina/os in ordinary traffic stops, a phenom-
enon that has been referred to as “driving while brown,” similar to the 
much-criticized practice of “driving while black” suffered by African 
Americans.146 One observer has noted that Latinos “are especially vul-
nerable to arrest for minor traffic violations, such as driving without a 
license or driving with an expired license.”147 (Until recently, only a few 
states allowed undocumented immigrants to be eligible to obtain dri-
ver’s licenses.)148 Commentators have observed “that Latinos are stop-
ped for minor traffic violations so that the officers can ascertain the 
 
142. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 984–96 (analyzing evidence that race played 
a significant role in Moncrieffe’s interactions with the police and in his 
conviction).  
143. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1683. 
144. Id. at 1693–94. 
145. See, e.g., Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828 (3d Cir. 2002) (reversing the 
entry of summary judgment in a case involving claim of racial discrimination 
against Latina/os by law enforcement officers in a state park). See generally 
Lupe S. Salinas, U.S. Latinos and Criminal Injustice 65–85, 107–44 
(2015) (analyzing the targeting of Latina/os by state and local law enforcement 
agencies). 
146. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Case for African American and Latina/o 
Cooperation in Challenging Racial Profiling in Law Enforcement, 55 Fla. 
L. Rev. 341, 357–63 (2003); see, e.g., Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 
612 (7th Cir. 2001) (addressing claims of racial profiling brought by Latina/os 
and African Americans); Giron v. City of Alexander, 693 F. Supp. 2d 904 
(E.D. Ark. 2010) (addressing racial profiling claims by Latina/os). 
147. Alia Al-Khatib, Comment, Putting a Hold on ICE: Why Law Enforcement 
Should Refuse to Honor Immigration Detainers, 64 Am. U. L. Rev. 109, 161 
(2014) (footnote omitted). 
148. See Vallerye Mosquera, Vehicle: Driving While Undocumented: Chapter 524 
Allows Undocumented Immigrants to Apply for Driver’s Licenses in Cali-
fornia, 45 McGeorge L. Rev. 603 (2014) (summarizing the provisions of a 
recently enacted California law permitting undocumented immigrants to 
be eligible to obtain driver’s licenses). 
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driver’s immigration status. Recent data . . . supports the existence 
of racial profiling . . . nationwide.”149 
In addition, the U.S. government at least initially deployed Secure 
Communities150 in predominantly Latina/o communities, instead of all 
communities with high crime rates as one would expect if the true aim 
of the program was to remove “criminal aliens” of all nationalities from 
the United States.151 In light of these facts, it should not be a surprise 
that, during the Obama presidency, the vast majority of the persons 
removed from the country consistently have been immigrants from 
Mexico and Central America, comprising a significantly higher percent-
age than those groups’ representation in the overall immigrant popula-
tion in the United States.152 
Two relatively recent decisions in which the Supreme Court reject-
ed removal orders involving efforts to deport lawful permanent residents 
from Mexico provide a concrete indication of the disparate impacts of 
the state and local “war on drugs” on Latina/o immigrants leading to 
possible removal. In Lopez v. Gonzales,153 the Supreme Court rejected 
the Justice Department’s argument that a lawful resident from Mexico 
convicted under state drug law for aiding and abetting another person’s 
possession of cocaine was an “aggravated felon”154 under the U.S. immi-
gration laws, requiring mandatory removal.155 Similarly, in Carachuri-
 
149. Angela M. Banks, The Curious Relationship Between “Self-Deportation” 
Policies and Naturalization Rates, 16 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1149, 1188 
(2012) (footnote omitted); see Brian Rodriguez, Latinos and the Criminal 
Justice System: Overcoming Racial Stigma From Trial to Incarceration, 
40 T. Marshall L. Rev. Online 7 (2015) (discussing how officers intention-
ally pull drivers over who appear to be Latina/o). 
150. See supra Part I.B.2. (summarizing the history surrounding the development 
of the Secure Communities program). 
151. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 87 (2013) (examining data showing crime rates and how Secure 
Communities was not initially deployed in areas with high crime rates, but 
in areas with large Latina/o populations); see also Thomas J. Miles & Adam 
B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence from Secure 
Communities, 57 J.L. & Econ. 937 (2014) (finding based on the empirical 
evidence that Secure Communities failed to reduce crime rates). 
152. See supra text accompanying notes 20 and 21. 
153. 549 U.S. 47 (2006). 
154. See infra text accompanying notes 176–182 (discussing the repeated congress-
ional expansion of the definition of “aggravated felony” in the U.S. immigration 
laws that subject noncitizens convicted of such felonies to mandatory detention 
and removal and rendering them ineligible for many forms of relief from 
removal). 
155. Lopez, 549 U.S. at 52.  
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Rosendo v. Holder,156 the Court set aside a removal order of a lawful 
permanent resident from Mexico who had two minor drug possession 
convictions, one for simple possession of a small amount of marijuana 
and one for unlawfully possessing a single tablet of a prescription 
drug.157 Both cases involved efforts by the Executive Branch to remove 
long term lawful residents of the United States from Mexico who were 
what can be reasonably characterized as small time drug offenders 
caught up in local enforcement of the “war on drugs.” 
III. How to Reduce the Racial Disparities in Removals 
For the time being, it appears that effective efforts to reduce racial 
inequality in criminal and immigration law enforcement will more likely 
come from legislative and policy changes than through legal challenges 
in the courts. This stems from the fact that the Supreme Court has in 
effect authorized racial profiling in both ordinary criminal and immigra-
tion enforcement efforts.158 That authorization understandably limits 
litigation as an effective tool for deterring reliance on race by law en-
forcement officers.159 Put differently, existing law makes it extremely 
difficult to successfully challenge racially discriminatory law enforce-
ment.160 The limitations on such challenges make litigation likely to put 
an end to only the most egregious patterns and practices of racial dis-
crimination.161 
In the historical moment in which we live, political action appears 
to be the most likely avenue for bringing about reform of immigration 
law and its enforcement. Unfortunately, immigration reform efforts 
have repeatedly stalled in Congress.162  
 
156. 560 U.S. 563 (2010). 
157. Id. at 566.  
158. See supra Part I.A. (explaining the Supreme Court decisions in Whren v. 
United States and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce). 
159. See Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread Constitutional 
Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for 
Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 Wis. L. Rev. 1109, 1151–54 (explaining 
how modern jurisprudence has diminished the constitutional rights of non-
citizens); Rosenbaum, supra note 34 at 499–504 (discussing the limitations 
on successful legal challenges to racial profiling). 
160. See supra text accompanying notes 55–58. 
161. See, e.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming in 
large part an injunction designed to end a pattern and practice of blatant 
discrimination against Latina/os by the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office 
in Arizona, headed by controversial Sheriff Joe Arpaio, in the name of criminal 
and immigration enforcement). 
162. See supra text accompanying notes 15–18 (explaining that, despite support 
from President Obama, Congress has failed to enact immigration reform). 
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This part of the Article first considers political action as a possible 
reform strategy and then proceeds to consider changes to the law that 
would tend to reduce the racially disparate impacts of the modern im-
migration removal system. 
A. The Potential of Political Activism 
There are indications that political action calling for criminal justice 
and immigration reform is a possibility for bringing about change. Polit-
ical engagement, in recent memory, has significantly influenced immi-
gration legislation and enforcement measures. For example, in 2006, 
thousands of people across the United States took to the streets in pro-
test and effectively killed a punitive immigration reform bill passed by 
the U.S. House of Representatives.163 The protesters demanded nothing 
less than justice for immigrants.  
Similarly, the DREAMers, college students brought to this country 
as children, advocated for reform of the immigration laws and their 
enforcement, have become a powerful national political force.164 Their 
activism helped prod the Obama administration to adopt the Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals program (known as DACA), which since 
2012 has provided limited relief to noncitizens brought to the United 
States as children, and to later propose an expanded deferred action 
program.165  
In addition, state and local resistance, combined with effective ad-
vocacy by activists in opposition, to aggressive federal removal efforts 
without doubt contributed to the U.S. government’s decision to disman-
tle the overbroad Secure Communities program. Such efforts also con-
tributed to the U.S. government’s decision to adopt a narrower enforce-
ment strategy directed at noncitizens actually convicted of serious 
 
163. See generally Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant Rights 
Marches of 2006 and the Prospects for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42 
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 99 (2007) (discussing the multiracial civil rights 
movement and its impact on immigration legislation); Sylvia R. Lazos 
Vargas, The Immigrant Rights Marches (Las Marchas): Did the “Gigante” 
(Giant) Wake Up or Does It Still Sleep Tonight?, 7 Nev. L.J. 780, 812–823 
(2007) (explaining the impact of the marches). 
164. See Mariela Olivares, Renewing the Dream: DREAM Act Redux and Immi-
gration Reform, 16 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 79, 85–98 (2013) (recounting the 
history of the perennial DREAM Act proposals in Congress); Michael A. 
Olivas, The Political Economy of the DREAM Act and the Legislative 
Process: A Case Study of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 55 Wayne 
L. Rev. 1757 (2009) (analyzing the complex politics of the DREAM Act 
and immigration reform generally). See generally John Tirman, Dream 
Chasers: Immigration and the American Backlash 91–109 (2015) 
(discussing the emergence of the DREAMers as a potent force in American 
politics). 
165. See supra text accompanying notes 118–122 (explaining DACA). 
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crimes as opposed to simply being arrested for suspicion of committing 
virtually any crime.166 
The time might be right for political action to address the racially 
disparate impacts of removals. Contemporary public opinion to a cert-
ain extent questions the reliance on race in law enforcement.167 Such 
sentiment has led to a number of legal and policy pronouncements that 
seek to restrict racial profiling in criminal law enforcement.168 Law en-
forcement goals in addition to racial justice priorities lend support to 
such efforts. Namely, racial profiling arguably serves to undermine trust 
and cooperation of minority communities with law enforcement169 in 
ways similar to how police involvement in immigration enforcement 
may deter noncitizen cooperation with police.170 
At this point in time, there appears to be little likelihood that the 
impacts of race can be removed root and branch from the American 
criminal justice system. However, political efforts can and should be 
made to attempt to minimize, not maximize, those racial impacts on 
the removal of immigrants from the United States. 
A handful of relatively modest changes to the U.S. immigration 
laws might reduce the impacts on state and local race-conscious law 
enforcement on zealous federal removal efforts.171 In so doing, these 
changes would lessen the impacts on Latina/os of the modern removal 
system’s reliance on the criminal justice system. More far-reaching re-
form to the law could bring about even greater reductions in the racial 
disparities of immigration enforcement. 
 
166. See supra Part I.B.2. (discussing Secure Communities). 
167. See supra text accompanying notes 46–48 (describing public condemnation 
of racial profiling). 
168. See, e.g., Sari Horwitz, Justice Dept. Announces New Rules to Curb Racial 
Profiling by Federal Law Enforcement, Wash. Post (Dec. 8, 2014), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-dept-to-announce-
new-rules-to-curb-racial-profiling-by-federal-law-enforcement/2014/12/07/ 
e00eca18-7e79-11e4-9f38-95a187e4c1f7_story.html [http://perma.cc/9P5L- 
35EF] (explaining the Obama administration’s new rules for racial profiling 
which apply to the Department of Homeland Security). 
169. See Harris, supra note 52, at 298–300 (discussing “deep cynicism among 
blacks about the fairness and legitimacy of law enforcement and courts” due 
to “racially targeted traffic stops”). 
170. See supra text accompanying notes 76–84 (stating that, to build trust with 
noncitizen communities, some cities prevent law-enforcement officers from 
inquiring about immigration status). 
171. See supra Part I (discussing contemporary attempts to reform the U.S. immi-
gration law). 
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B. Possible Reforms 
This Article does not contend that the removal of noncitizens based 
on criminal convictions should be eliminated. Rather, it initially sug-
gests that greater attention be paid to the racial consequences of the 
linkage of the contemporary criminal justice and immigration removal 
systems. The Article calls for, as a beginning, incremental changes in 
law and policy. A few possibilities immediately come to mind.172 
As previously discussed,173 drug crimes have a well-recognized rela-
tionship to racially biased criminal law enforcement. To make matters 
worse for immigrants, the removal provisions based on criminal convict-
ions for drug offenses in the U.S. immigration laws are most unforgiv-
ing.174 One relatively modest reform possibility would be to return 
greater discretion to judges in deciding which noncitizens should be 
removed from the country for drug convictions and possibly other 
crimes. Such discretion generally existed under the law before Congress 
passed major enforcement-oriented immigration reforms in 1996, which 
made removal, and detention pending removal, mandatory for a great 
many noncitizens convicted of criminal, especially drug, offenses.175 
 
172. For possible reforms in addition to those outlined here, see Hum. Rts. 
Watch, supra note 139, at 10–11.  
173. See supra text accompanying notes 19–21.  
174. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(A)(2)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1227 
(a)(2)(B) (2012) (making noncitizens convicted for virtually any drug crime 
subject to removal from the United States). For critical analysis of the 
serious adverse immigration consequences of drug convictions, see Wilber 
A. Barillas, Collateral Damage: Drug Enforcement & Its Impact on the 
Deportation of Legal Permanent Residents, 34 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. 1, 
8–19 (2014) (explaining the legislation and rise of drug-based deportations); 
Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences 
of Criminal Convictions, 6 J. Gender Race & Just. 253, 261 (2002) 
(noting that “any drug violation other than a marijuana offense can lead 
to deportation of a non-citizen”); see also Jordan Cunnings, Comment, 
Nonserious Marijuana Offenses and Noncitizens: Uncounseled Pleas and 
Disproportionate Consequences, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 510 (2015) (analyzing 
negative immigration impacts on noncitizens of nonserious marijuana 
convictions). 
175. See Bill Ong Hing, Re-Examining the Zero-Tolerance Approach to Deporting 
Aggravated Felons: Restoring Discretionary Waivers and Developing New 
Tools, 8 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 141, 163–74 (2014) (explaining current 
trends in detention of noncitizens for drug offenses); Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond 
Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New Narratives in the U.S. 
Immigration System, 26 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 207, 209–13 (2012) (analyzing 
the importance of judicial discretion in removal proceedings); Maritza I. 
Reyes, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law: The Vital Role of Judicial Dis-
cretion in the Removal of Lawful Permanent Residents, 84 Temp. L. Rev. 
637, 655–70 (2012) (providing a history of judicial discretion in removal 
proceedings); Rebecca Sharpless, Clear and Simple Deportation Rules for 
Crimes: Why We Need Them and Why It’s Hard to Get Them, 92 Denv. 
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Legislative reform might also include changes to the immigration 
laws that narrow the definition of “aggravated felony.”176 The current 
broad definition relegates noncitizens convicted of a plethora of crim-
es—many of which in fact are neither felonies or particularly serious—
to mandatory detention and removal.177 An aggravated felony convic-
tion also renders noncitizens ineligible for most forms of relief from re-
moval.178 Narrowing the definition would help eliminate some of the 
excesses of the modern criminal Latina/o removal machine. To this 
point in time, however, Congress has consistently moved in the opposite 
direction and has regularly passed increasingly harsh legislation design-
 
U. L. Rev. 933, 959–61 (2015) (advocating the restoration of judicial 
discretion in removal proceedings); see also Jason A. Cade, Return of the 
JRAD, N.Y.U. L. Rev. Online (2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2669862 [http://perma.cc/X865-VVEJ] (analyzing implic-
ations of renowned federal district court Judge Jack Weinstein’s recommend-
ation, without current statutory authorization, that a lawful permanent 
resident not be removed from the United States for a criminal conviction). 
176. See INA § 101(A)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012) (defining “aggravated 
felony” for purposes of the U.S. immigration laws); see also Sharpless, supra 
note 175, at 957–59 (calling for reform of the immigration laws to limit removal 
to convictions for crimes for which noncitizen actually served more than five 
years in prison); Aaron Lang, Note, An Opportunity for Change? Aggravated 
Felonies in Immigration Proceedings and the Effect of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 
33 B.U. Int’l L.J. 523, 541–57 (2015) (suggesting possible reforms to 
provisions of the immigration laws requiring the removal of noncitizens 
convicted of an “aggravated felony”). 
177. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (holding that detaining 
noncitizens before their removal proceedings did not violate the Fifth Amend-
ment); see also Tom K. Wong, Rights, Deportation, and Detention 
in the Age of Immigration Control 119–23 (2015) (summarizing modern 
use of detention of immigrants in the United States); César Cuauhtémoc 
García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1346 (2014) (contending that the modern immigration detention system 
is punitive in nature); Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye): 
Stipulated Orders of Removal and the Crisis in Immigration Adjudication, 
91 N.C. L. Rev. 475, 491 (2013) (“[I]mmigration detention during the 
pendency of one’s removal proceedings, and even throughout the appeals 
process, is a harsh reality.”) (footnote omitted); Mark Noferi, Making Civil 
Immigration Detention “Civil,” and Examining the Emerging U.S. Civil 
Detention Paradigm, 27 J. C.R. & Econ. Dev. 533 (2014) (analyzing the 
Obama administration’s efforts to reform the immigrant detention system). 
Litigation has successfully sought to ensure some judicial review of the 
mandatory detention of noncitizens. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 
1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that immigrants in detention must be 
afforded individual bond hearings). The anti-Latina/o impacts of immigrant 
detention are discussed supra text accompanying notes 100–102. 
178. See, e.g., INA § 240a(A)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2012) (providing that 
a lawful permanent resident convicted of an aggravated felony is ineligible 
for cancellation of removal). 
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ed to punish “criminal aliens.” In a series of pieces of legislation, Con-
gress has expanded the definition of an aggravated felony for purposes 
of removal: 
When Congress first enacted the aggravated felony removal cate-
gory in 1988, only three serious crimes were included: murder, 
drug trafficking, and firearms trafficking. The current list—now 
at twenty-eight offenses, some of which create further sub-cate-
gories—includes crimes that are neither aggravated nor felonies 
under criminal law. Misdemeanor drug possession with a one-year 
sentence can qualify as an aggravated felony, as does a year of 
probation with a suspended sentence for pulling hair—a mis-
demeanor under Georgia law. Convictions for selling ten dollars 
worth of marijuana, theft of a ten-dollar video game, shoplifting 
fifteen dollars worth of baby clothes, and forging a check for less 
than twenty dollars have all been held to be aggravated felonies. 
Aggravated felonies trigger mandatory detention, deportation 
without the possibility of almost all forms of discretionary relief 
[from removal], including asylum and cancellation of removal, and 
a permanent bar on lawful reentry.179 
Because of the adverse consequences of a criminal conviction for an 
aggravated felony, the question whether a criminal offense falls into 
that category of crimes that are hotly litigated in removal proceedings. 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the aggravated felony provisions 
under immigration law on numerous occasions in recent years; as we 
have seen, immigrants have regularly convinced the Court to set aside 
removal orders based on relatively minor drug convictions.180 
 
179. Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor 
Court, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 1751, 1758–59 (2013) (footnotes omitted); 
see Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, 
Crime Control and National Security, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1827, 1843–50 
(2007) (explaining the broadening classification of “criminal aliens”); see 
also Angela M. Banks, Proportional Deportation, 55 Wayne L. Rev. 1651 
(2009) (contending that the expansion of criminal removals under the immi-
gration laws has been punitive and that the Constitution should be invoked 
to ensure that removals are proportional to the gravity of crimes committed); 
Jeff Yates, Todd A. Collins & Gabriel J. Chin, A War on Drugs or a War 
on Immigrants? Expanding the Definition of “Drug Trafficking” in Determin-
ing Aggravated Felon Status for Noncitizens, 64 Md. L. Rev. 875 (2005) 
(criticizing the courts’ expansive interpretation of “aggravated felony” with 
respect to drug crimes). 
180. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 141–157 (explaining the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in criminal removal cases). 
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Another minor statutory reform could reduce racial disparities in 
immigration enforcement. Immigrant detention, often directed at immi-
grants convicted of crimes, has adverse impacts on Latina/os.181 Deten-
tion, which has been increasingly used as a tool of immigration enforce-
ment,182 could be reduced. To that end, congressional quotas for immig-
rant detentions might be eliminated. The “bed quotas” require the de-
tention of certain numbers of immigrants and in effect mandate immi-
gration arrests and detentions.183 Elimination of the quotas could reduce 
the incentives to overenforce the immigration laws and tend to reduce 
detention resulting from racially disparate criminal law enforcement. 
The possible reforms suggested above to reduce the racial impacts 
of the contemporary removal system are not meant to be exhaustive. 
Broader law and policy changes also might serve that end. One could 
imagine legislative prohibition of racial profiling, a common practice in 
modern criminal and immigration enforcement, which adversely affects 
minorities.184 In addition, a return to the historical separation of crimin-
al law and immigration enforcement might reduce the racial disparities 
in removals.185 
At a more fundamental level, the current racial demographics of 
immigration enforcement suggest that the time is right for the United 
States to overhaul its immigration system in more far-reaching ways. 
Reformers urgently need to advocate that the law be changed to make 
it more enforceable and ensure that enforcement is less predisposed 
toward noncitizens of color.186 Current law, among other things, has led 
to an array of disparate impacts on racial minorities, especially non-
citizens from Mexico and Central America, in addition to detention and 
 
181. See supra text accompanying notes 100–103 (discussing the high 
percentage of Latina/os detained subject to immigrant detention). 
182. See supra text accompanying note 18 (mentioning Obama administration’s 
mass detention of Central Americans fleeing violence in 2014). 
183. See Roque Planas, Bed Quota Fuels ‘Inhumane’ and ‘Unnecessary’ Immigrant 
Detention: Report, Huffington Post (Apr. 15, 2015, 6:04 PM), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/15/private-prison-immigrant-detention_ 
n_7072902.html [http://perma.cc/8JBG-4XZ3] (explaining that private 
prisons have lobbied for increased bed quotas); End the Immigration 
Detention Bed Quota, Detention Watch Network (Feb. 2014), http:// 
detentionwatchnetwork.org/EndTheQuotaNarrative [http://perma.cc/8TBT- 
NT2Y] (advocating ending the bed quota). 
184. See supra Part I.A. (noting that the Supreme Court decisions generally permit 
racial profiling). 
185.See supra text accompanying notes 76–80 (observing that criminal law and 
immigration enforcement were historically separated).  
186. For possibilities for liberalizing admissions under the U.S. immigration laws, 
see Kevin R. Johnson, Opening the Floodgates: Why America Needs 
to Rethink Its Borders and Immigration Laws (2007). 
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removals. The law, for example, has led to the creation of an undocu-
mented population of millions of people—a majority of who from Mex-
ico who are presumptively subject to removal—and a racial caste sys-
tem in the labor market—with undocumented workers, many of whom 
are Latina/o, often exploited. 
Conclusion 
Little attention has been paid to the racially disproportionate im-
pacts of the criminal justice system combined with the contemporary 
immigration enforcement focus of the federal government on “criminal 
aliens.”187 Nonetheless, examination of the interaction of the two sys-
tems demonstrates that the reliance on the federal, state, and local 
criminal justice systems in immigration enforcement has glaring racial 
impacts. The overwhelming number of noncitizens currently deported 
from the United States are from Mexico and Central America.188 The 
racially suspect criminal justice system effectively constitutes a Lat-
ina/o pipeline into removals, which is often considered to be nothing 
more than color-blind enforcement of the immigration laws and adher-
ence to the “rule of law.” 
Despite the undisputable racial disparities in modern immigration 
enforcement, the dominant critique in the scholarship analyzing the 
confluence of criminal law and immigration law focuses primarily on 
the unfairness of overbroad removals on noncitizens.189 This Article 
builds on existing scholarship to extend the criticism and to specifically 
question the racial impacts of the modern American crimmigration 
state. It aims to more directly challenge the racially disparate conse-
quences of excessive reliance on the criminal justice system as the basis 
for triggering the removal of noncitizens from the United States.190 
Increasing state and local involvement in federal immigration re-
movals has come at a time of considerable public support for immigra-
tion enforcement and a general discomfort with the changes brought 
about by a growing Latina/o population.191 A palpable dose of anti-
immigrant and anti-Latina/o sentiment influences public opinion and 
helps buttress support for immigration enforcement.192 Consequently, 
removal efforts that have had dramatic impacts on Latina/os thus have 
 
187. See supra text accompanying notes 27–31. 
188. See supra text accompanying notes 18–21, 96–102.  
189. See supra text accompanying notes 27–29.  
190. See supra Parts I–II. 
191. See supra Part I.B. 
192. See supra text accompanying note 127. 
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generally been popular with the public.193 Responding to such concerns, 
state and local governments have played increasingly more significant 
roles in modern immigration enforcement efforts. Indeed, some states, 
most notably Arizona but also Georgia, South Carolina, among others, 
have enacted laws that affirmatively require local police to assist fed-
eral immigration enforcement.194 Latina/os predominantly have suffered 
from the enforcement of those laws. 
Relatively minor reforms to U.S. immigration law could begin to 
reduce the racial impacts of the reliance on the criminal justice system 
for removals.195 This Article has sketched some possible changes to the 
law, including legislation narrowing the criminal removal provisions of 
the immigration laws and limiting the use of immigration detention as 
an enforcement tool.196 Broader changes—such as an outright ban on 
racial profiling in criminal and immigration enforcement, a return to 
the historical separation of criminal and immigration enforcement, and 
reforms that allow for more liberal and realistic immigrant admissions 
criteria—would go far to reduce the disparate impacts on Latina/os 
that arise from modern immigration enforcement.197 
To bring about meaningful law and policy reform, advocates should 
build on the public skepticism about race-based law enforcement and 
promote reduction of its impacts on removals as a pressing civil rights 
necessity, taking the moral high ground away from those who demand 
adherence to the rule of law. By so doing, reformers can more effectively 
advocate changes to federal immigration and other laws that attempt 
to moderate, if not minimize, the disparate racial impacts on removals 
resulting from reliance on contemporary criminal law enforcement.198 
Nothing less than a new civil rights movement, with racial justice as a 
fundamental tenet, can help animate and energize the immigration re-
form movement. 
 
193. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
194. See supra Part I.B.3. 
195. See supra Part III.B. 
196. See id. 
197. See id.  
198. See Part II. 
